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Abstract 
In this report, two new fundamental concepts on untraceable divisible off-line 
electronic cash are proposed. The first concept is to allow each divisible elec-
tronic coin to bear a daily or monthly spending limit, which confines the spend-
ing of this particular coin to an amount not over the limit within one day or 
one month. The second concept is to impose an interest rate on the balance 
of each divisible electronic cash. These two concepts are also realized into two 
compatible and practical schemes. 
Another research result I presented is about improvements of efficiency on 
storage and transmission of divisible untraceable off-line binary tree electronic 
coins. An abacus type electronic cash scheme is described and combinations of 
abacus type data structure with multi-tree based coins are discussed. 
Besides attaining these results, a general introduction to electronic cash; a 
brief description of the terminologies and a collection of remarkable electronic 
cash schemes are presented. I appraise them to be some valuable contributions 
for further studies and researches. Finally, an overview on contemporary account 













介紹一些重要的文獻以供參考°最後，對一些流行於h t e m e t上的銀行卡 
或信用卡的“付款系統”（payment systems)作一個簡介。 
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Ever since the dawn of Mankind, people have been exchanging goods and ser-
vices. During the late Pleistocene Age, Neanderthal men used their chipped 
stone tools to exchange animal flesh in barter. The obvious limitations of this 
kind of exchange led to the use of proxies for value. Shells and gems were used 
to perform the primitive functions of money as bearer instruments. Later on, 
pieces of precious metal came to be shaped into coins. The use of paper notes 
has also evolved with the development of printing. Economic historians often 
suggest that the switch from barter to the use of money allowed for more rapid 
economic growth of the man's history. We conclude all kinds of trades and 
business activities that are carried out in our society as commerce. 
According to Miller [Mil88], money has four traditional functions: medium of 
exchange, unit of accounting, store of value and standard of deferred payment. 
Nowadays, human interactions are increasing at a good pace with the advance-
ments of technologies. Our society is getting more complicated and divergent 
than ever before. As a natural extension, the world is now migrating into a new 
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era of 'cyber，. More and more information and valuable documents are handled 
in electronic forms. Many trades and business activities are also being carried 
out by exchanging of electronic signals. A new direction in the development of 
commerce has already been emerged. We called it - Electronic Commerce. 
The development of electronic commerce relies heavily on the advancements 
of computer-based technologies. Computer-based technologies are mainly re-
ferred to the connections of thousands and millions of computers around the 
world. These globally connected computer networks are bringing new impact 
on our traditional society. Cybernate society has already been established which 
is furnished by inter-connected computers and advanced electronic equipment. 
Not only that, many types of money or payment means are also adopted. Ex-
amples of these new payment means include Electronic Cash, various kinds of 
credit card based Internet Payment Systems and Prepaid Smart Cards. These 
new payment means are different from our old acquaintances such as paper bank 
notes and nickel coins. They perform credit or debit via electronic signals rather 
than through the use of paper memo. Paper bills, currencies and checks are no 
longer involved any more. 
To look into the future, new prospects are continually opening to this field 
without any sign of shrinking. More payment means are going to be divulged. 
Many of them may even become tomorrow's payment standards. 
2 
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Figure 1.1: Components of Electronic Commerce 
1.1 Electronic Commerce 
A cashless society is emerging; electronic funds are traveling to-and-fro through 
computer networks and links of electronic equipment. Trades and business activ-
ities carried out in this environment are concluded as Electronic Commerce. 
There are several books [Kos97, For97, Lyn96, ECo] and online resources re-
garding this new emerging field can be consulted. 
Figure 1.1 shows the major components which construct the electronic com-
merce. Basically, it can be divided into two aspects: Business-to-business 
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aspect and C o n s u m e r aspect. In business-to-business aspect, it is essential to 
work out standards and to let the involved companies to follow and to com-
ply with. As early as 1960s, large business enterprises have already begun 
to conduct their business-to-business transactions using E l e c t r o n i c da ta in-
t e r c h a n g e (EDI) [Kim91, MC93] on private computer network called Va lue 
A d d e d N e t w o r k (VAN). EDI is a matured general-purpose system which is 
standardized by the industries. EDI allows companies to exchange business doc-
uments in a standardized form and the documents are transmitted securely and 
efficiently on the private networks at most of the time. For the bank systems, 
they have been using dedicated networks for e l e c t r o n i c f u n d s t rans fer (EFT) 
almost as long. Furthermore, with the increased awareness and popularity of the 
Internet, these systems are no longer sticking on the pure private networks only. 
Actually, both EDI and EFT can be conducted over the Internet. Recently, 
EDI service providers are trying to incorporate Internet services in the existing 
EDI systems. Furthermore, new series of specifications for handling EDI on the 
Internet have already been begun to work out. 
In consumer aspect, things are getting divergent. Not only divergent, but also 
inter-crossed. First of all, there are many electronic funds transfer systems 
being built up. Terms that we are familiar with including Electronic Banking, 
Phone Banking, ATM, etc. All of them are checkless money transfer systems. 
Money is transferred from one account to another by means of electronic signals. 
In this way, individual bank accounts are automatically credited and/or debited 
without any physical involvement of paper bills. These systems are the most 
matured ones in the consumer aspect of electronic commerce. 
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Next, we notice that there are various kinds of plastic cards in our pock-
ets nowadays. Some are prepaid telephone cards and some others are common 
stored value transportation cards. You may also have some kinds of Elec-
tronic Purses such as Visa Cash^ and Mondex^ These are all the payment 
means emerged from the advancements of smart card technologies. A smart card 
Z094], credit card sized plastic card, but has a chip embedded which equips 
hard-wired computing power and has storage capacity. Smart card architecture 
provides physical security to prevent forgery. It takes strict control of chip man-
ufacturing, supplying, personalization and card issuing. Also, various protocols 
are required for conducting secure card transactions. 
Besides electronic fund transfer systems and electronic purses, Internet Com-
merce is another important field which experiences remarkable development in 
recent years. Internet are becoming popular and user-friendly with the thanks 
to World Wide Web ( W W W ) . More and more people today are able to browse 
the web sites on Internet easily for obtaining abundant information. More infor-
mation people acquired, hungrier they are. In the meantime, business activities 
and trades are also carried out on Internet for cost effectiveness and flexibility. 
Therefore many cyber shops and on-line shopping malls have been built up on 
the Internet. Hundreds more of cyber-shop web sites are creating every day 
around the world. Those cyber-shops and shopping malls^ provide a wide range 
of choices for their customers from daily commodities to luxury collections. In 
order to run business on Internet, we need appropriate payment means and some 
iwww.visa.com/cgi-bin/vee/pd/cash/main.html?2+0 
2www.mondex.com 
^Examples such as www.amazon.com,www.montywong.com,www.arkadia.com.hk， 
www.virtualvin.com,imsp001.netvigator.com/shopping/wellcom/index.html, ， 
www.llbean.com, etc. ‘ 
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Figure 1.2: Various Internet Payment Systems 
convenient payment systems. As this is a new industry, no single payment sys-
tem has ever been dominating the market. Instead, a lot of different kinds of 
payment systems are built up to compete for a considerable market share. 
Among the available Internet payment systems, two main approaches have 
got the leading positions: A c c o u n t B a s e d a p p r o a c h and E l e c t r o n i c Cash 
a p p r o a c h as shown in Figure 1.2. Account cards include credit cards and 
bankcards. One common characteristic of these cards is that a cardholder should 
first obtain an account. The account can be obtained from a bank, an agent 
or simply from a card issuer. During payment, money is withdrawn from the 
holder's account automatically, if it is a bankcard, or a proceed of loan to the 
card holder by the issuer, if it is a credit card. There are many other types of 
payment systems operating on the Internet. Since there isn't any standard to 
confine the protocols as well as the practices of the implementation of them, a 
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lot of different kinds of payment systems have been established. Even worse, 
almost all of these systems are different from each other in certain extent and 
they are also incompatible with each other. Consequently, cyber shops have to 
accept at least one or several of such systems as an interim or even a permanent 
solution. 
In Figure 1.2, it also shows five main approaches of account card based 
payment systems. They are selected because all of them have gained certain 
extent of popularity on the Internet. In Appendix A, I will describe these 
payment systems in details for ease of reference. 
Now, we stop stalking forward for a while and give a way back to think about 
if there is any relationship between electronic purse and Internet commerce. We 
notice that there are many remarkable achievements obtained on purse cards and 
there are also many innovative applications dug out at the same time. These 
have already brought a tremendous impact on Internet commerce. One of the 
examples is to use smart card to store the electronic coins. In this way, a user 
can use the withdrawn electronic coins to buy things from both traditional shops 
in the street and cyber shops on the Internet. 
1.2 Electronic Cash 
Finally, we still have one oval in Figure 1.1 which hasn't been described yet. This 
oval resides and overlaps between Internet Commerce and Electronic Purses. It's 
called Electronic Cash. Electronic cash is analogous to the conventional paper 
bank notes or nickel coins in the sense of certain properties. The difference is 
that electronic cash is used in electronic media. 
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Traditional physical cash has certain properties of an anonymous medium. 
However, its anonymous use is significantly constrained by some considerations. 
Firstly, it's bulky. Large amounts of money take up a certain amount of space. 
Secondly, it's palpable. Physical cash cannot be transferred over a computer 
network, and transferring it securely to a remote payee takes time and resources 
that may render the process somewhat visible. Thirdly, it's traceable. If law 
enforcement authorities know the serial numbers of bills being tracked, financial 
institutions may be able to help identify the next person who deposits them. 
Electronic cash, on the other hand, outstrip the above issues for physical 
cash. Furthermore, it can strike a balance between anonymity and traceability. 
A system of electronic cash consists of "Electronic Coins which are num-
bers". This concept is first described by David Chaum in [Cha83]. Since the 
electronic coins are represented by just some strings of numbers, they can be 
stored in any kinds of physical media. For example, they can be stored in smart 
cards or computer storage media such as RAMs, hard drives, tapes, etc. Even 
broader perception, they can also be stored remotely at an agent's site on any 
connected communications network such as Internet. This concept stimulates 
new developments on maintaining the integrity and security of the electronic 
cash systems. It also raises research interests on improving the efficiency of such 
systems. Many cryptographic techniques have been employed and a handful of 
inspirational schemes have been proposed. In addition to that, it's also shown 
that the electronic commerce will outstrip our traditional commerce in the next 
ten years. In chapter 3, more detailed materials will be elaborated. 
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1.3 What This Report Contains 
This thesis addresses the topic of electronic cash — An aspect dwells on em-
ploying various kinds of cryptographic techniques and schemes to realize and to 
conduct anonymous electronic payments in an environment of mutual mistrust 
among the bank and the system users. 
In my studies, intensive readings and abundant survey of the state-of-the-art 
electronic cash schemes have been made throughout the whole research period. 
In order to get a panorama of electronic cash first, a general introduction to 
electronic cash is given in chapter 3. Afterwards, a brief description of the 
terminologies and a collection of remarkable schemes are described. In chapter 2, 
some cryptographic techniques and number theoretic properties are stated. To 
acquaint with the mathematical background is very useful for understanding the 
electronic cash schemes' cryptographic protocols and for conducting researches 
in this field. 
In this report, I devote most of the efforts to present new research results ob-
tained. With the crucial inspirations and involvement of Prof. Wei, we propose 
two new fundamental concepts on untraceable divisible off-line electronic cash 
in chapters 4 and 5. The first concept is to allow each divisible electronic coin 
to bear a daily or monthly spending limit. It confines the total amount spent of 
a particular coin to the specified limit within one day or one month. The second 
concept is to impose an interest rate on the balance of each divisible electronic 
coin. 
Currently proposed electronic cash schemes are more or less the debit type. 
Electronic coins are minted by the bank and issued to the user after an equivalent 
9 
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amount of money is deducted from the user's account. The user, on the other 
side, uses his coins to buy goods or to pay for services until all of them have been 
used up. There isn't any interest bore to the balance of electronic coins at any 
time. In our conceptual scheme, we will show how to impose an interest rate on 
the balance of electronic coins at the end of a certain period. For positive interest 
rate, the user's electronic coins are just the money stored in his bank savings 
account and interest will be added to the balance of electronic coins. There are 
many other applications you can think about by employing these two concepts. 
In section 5.6, I allot a few words to introduce some intuitional applications. 
To realize these two new concepts, we use a single term direct construction 
technique at withdrawal protocol. This technique provides higher efficiency than 
that of the cut-and-choose methodology (section 2.13). Also, we employ a secret 
sharing line technique for detecting double-spending at payment protocol. 
In chapter 6, another research result is presented. This result improves the 
efficiency on storage and transmission of divisible untraceable off-line binary tree 
electronic coins. An abacus type electronic cash scheme is described and combi-
nations of abacus type data structure with multi-tree based coins are discussed. 
In the annex, an overview on contemporary account card based Internet 
payment systems is also provided. 
In this report, there are a handful of references and worthy resources that 
can be obtained on the Internet. To ease reading, I jot them down as footnotes 




Cryptographic systems have been used for centuries by military and diplomatic 
organizations to keep messages secret and to authenticate the involved parties. 
Over the last decade, cryptology has been emerged from art to science and was 
incurred drastic evolution with the fast-growing global communications needs 
and commercial applications. In the field of electronic cash, we heavily employ 
dozens of cryptographic techniques and methodologies in order to attain the 
stringent requirements listed for an electronic cash system. 
In this section, we'll review some points in number theory and some impor-
tant cryptographic techniques which will be employed in the later parts of this 
thesis. Few related topics of cryptography and number theory will be covered 
in this chapter that are applicable to following chapters. Detailed mathemati-
cal text in number theory can be consulted from many textbooks. [Niv72] and 
'Sha78] are my favorite. Also, many cryptographic resources are collected in 
MVOV97, Sch94, Sim92, Sti95, Tsi97, CLS94 . 
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2.1 Euler Totient Function 
If consider arithmetic modulo n, then a reduced set o f residues is a subset 
of the complete set of residues modulo n which are relatively prime to n. The 
Euler totient function, also called the Euler phi function and written as 
4>{n), is the number of elements in the reduced set of residues. In short, 4>(n) is 
the number of positive integers less than n that are relatively prime to n. This 
was first described by the mathematician Leonhard Euler (pronounced "Oiler") 
in the eighteenth century. 
If n is prime, then c/>(n) = n — 1. If n = p x q, where p and q are prime, 
then 0(n) = {p — l){q - 1). These numbers appear frequently in the public-key 
algorithms. 
2.2 Fermat,s Little Theorem 
If m is prime, a is not a multiple of m, then Fermat's little theorem implies 
that 
广 1 = 1 ( m o d m ) . (2.1) 
2.3 Quadratic Residues 
If p is prime and a is less than p, then a is a quadratic residue modulo p if 
x^ 三 a (mod p), for some x. (2.2) 
There are exactly {p - 1) /2 quadratic residues modulo p (denoted as QRp) and 
the same number of quadratic nonresidues modulo p (denoted as QNRp), Also, 
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if a is a quadratic residue modulo p, then a has exactly two square roots: one 
between 0 and [p — 1)/2, and the other between {p — 1) /2 and (p — 1). One of 
these two square roots is also a quadratic residue modulo p and it is called the 
principle square root. 
If n is the product of two primes, p and g, there are exactly (p — l ) (g — l)/4 
quadratic residues modulo n. 
2.4 Legendre Symbol 
Definition Let p be an odd prime and a be an integer. The Legendre symbol 
(^) is defined to be 
0, if p\a, 
(芸）= 1, i f a e Q R , , (2.3) 
� — 1 , i f a e Q N R p , 
An easy way to calculate (^) is 
( 5 ) = a ( H / 2 m o d p . (2.4) 
Properties The properties of Legendre symbol can be summarized as below. 
Let p be an odd prime and a, b G Z . 
(i) C-) = 1 and ( f ) = ( - l ) ( " i ) / 2 . Hence - 1 G QR, if p = 1 (mod 4), and 
-leQNRpiip = 3 (mod 4). 
(ii) { f ) = i^-)C-). Hence i f a G Z；, then ( f ) = 1 and ( f ) = (^). 
( i i i ) I f a E 6 (mod p ) , t h e n ( | ) = (^). 
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(iv) C-) = ( - l ) ( f - i ) / 8 . Hence � =1 if p 三 1 or 7 (mod 8), and � = - 1 if 
p 三 3 or 5 (mod 8). 
(v) If q is an odd prime distinct from p, then 
[ l ) = ( i ) ( _ i ) (p - i ) ( 9 - i ) / 4 
q P 
This is law of quadratic reciprocity. ( ^ =(》）unless both p and q are 
congruent to 3 modulo 4, in which case (^) = —(!)• 
2.5 Jacobi Symbol 
The Jacobi symbol (^) is a generalization of the Legendre symbol for n > 3 
with odd prime factorization n = p[^pl^ .. -pl^. 
Definition It is defined to be: 
0 - C r ( > - ( > 
^ Pl P2 Pk 
Properties Let m > 3，n > 3 be odd integers, and a, b e Z . Then, the Jacobi 
symbol has the following properties: 
(i). (^) = 0,1, or - 1. Moreover, (^) = 0 if and only i f g c d ( a , n ) + 1. 
(ii)- ( ^ ) = ( ^ ) ( ! ) - Hence if a G Z；, then ( ^ ) 二 1. 
( i i i) .(丄）=(_^)(还). 
\ , \mn, \ m , \n, 
H. e) = i. 
(v). ( ^ ) = ( - l ) ( H ) / 2 . Hence ( ^ ) = 1 if n = 1 (mod 4), and ( ^ ) = - 1 if 
n = 3 (mod 4). 
14 
Chapter 2 Cryptographic Background 
(vi). C-) = ( - l f - i ) / 8 . Hence � =1 if n 三 1 or 7 (mod 8), and � = - 1 
if n 三 3 or 5 (mod 8). 
(vii). ( f ) = ( ， — l )—-i)(n-i) /4. In other w o r d s , � = � unless both m and 
n are congruent to 3 modulo 4, in which case (—) = —(^) , 
^ 71 ‘ V 77¾ / • 
(viii). ( ! ) = ( 申 ) . 
Note that (^) does not reveal whether or not a is a quadratic residue modulo 
n. It is indeed that if a € QRn, then (^) = 1. However, if (^ ) = 1, it is 
not necessary that a G QRn- Let 人 = { a G Z* | (^) = 1}. The set of 
pseudosquares modulo n, denoted QR^, is defined to be the set 人 — Q R ^ . 
For a specific dwelling on, let p and q are odd primes, n 二 p x q and z 6 Z；. 
Then, z is a quadratic residue modulo n if and only if z G QRp and z G QR^ 
(use Legendre symbol to check them). 
|Q^„| = | _ J = [p - l)(q — 1)/4; that is, half of the elements in 人 are 
quadratic residues and the other half are pseudosquares. 
Now, if z G QRn, there are exactly 4 square roots of the form { x , n - x, y, n -
y } in Z ; . And one square root is also a quadratic residue and is called pr inc ip le 
square r o o t of z modulo n. 
If z G QRn and p, q are known, then the square roots of z modulo n can 
be found in probabilistic polynomial time. Refer to §3.5 Computing square 
roots in Z „ of [MVOV97] for details. 
15 
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( f ) ( f ) ^i^.)'^W 
1 1 ^(1,1) � 
_ i _ _ - 1 Z(i,_i) 丁 
_ i _ _ 1 Z(_i,i) 丁 
-1 -1 ^(-1,-1) 1— 
Table 2.1: 4 Classes for a G Z； 
2.6 Blum Integer 
Definition If p and q are two primes, and both are congruent to 3 modulo 4, 
then n = p x q is called a Blum integer. 
If n is a Blum integer, and let a G QRn^ a has exactly four square roots, one 
of which is also a square (i.e. exactly one of which is also in QRn)\ this is the 
principle square root. 
Properties Let there is a Blum integer n = pq where p and q are distinct 
primes each congruent to 3 modulo 4. 
(i) ( ^ = ( f ) ( f ) = L 
( i i ) ( � ) = © since ( f ) = - ( 爹 ) a n d { f ) = - ( f ) . 
(iii) If x,y e Z； and a:^  三 y^ (mod n), 士0^土" are 4 square roots where 
| ± r | ¥ | ± y | . Also, ( f ) = - ( J ) . 
(iv) If a e Z；；, Z* can be classified into 4 classes as shown in Table 2.1 Clearly, 
only Z(i ’ i) denotes the set of quadratic residue integers in Z*. We can 
denote Z(i,i) as QRn and denote the other 3 classes as QNE^. 
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(V) If z € QRn, z has exactly one square root in each Z(i,j) for i = { 0 , 1 } and 
j = { 0 , 1 } . These 4 square roots are relatively prime square (mod pq) as 
a, 6], [ - a , - 6 ] , [a, - 6 ] and [ - a , 6] where a is a quadratic residue of p and b 
is a quadratic residue of q. 
Extended Properties 
(i) For n = p x q where p and q are primes each congruent to 3 modulo 4. Let 
X G QRn- Then, for any integer t (1 < t), there are exactly 4 square roots 
of X — y1,y2,y3 and y4 such that 
yf = X (mod n) 
(ii) yi G Z(i，i)，y2 G Z(i , - i ) , y3 G Z(_i,i) and y^ € Z ( - i , - i ) . 
(iii) yi 三 - y 4 (mod n), and y2 三 - y 3 (mod n). 
(iv) ( ^ ) = (，) = 1 and (，) = ( f ) = - 1 . 
The above proposition immediately implies that four values yi to y4 of 2^-th root 
y of X can be uniquely determined by knowing the following two information: 
1. one root yields whether (^) = 1 or — 1, and 
2. one root gives whether y < n / 2 or not. 
This is because when y < n /2 , there are two values of y: one of which has 
(^) = 1 and the other has (^) = - 1 . 
Also, to obtain these 4 roots (a: !" ' (niod n)) can be efficient from a:, p and q 
in expected polynomial time. Details of the solving algorithm can be referred to 
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§3.44 Algorithm of [MVOV97]. However, if you don't know the prime factors 
p and q of n, to compute the 4 square roots solely from x and n is as difficult as 
factoring n. 
2.7 Williams Integer 
Definition A Williams integer [Wil80] is a composite integer of the form 
n = p X q where p and q are distinct primes where p 三 3 (mod 8) and q 三 7 
(mod 8). 
Properties From the definition, it can be derived that n = 5 (mod 8). Also, 
the Williams integer is a specific type of Blum integer. So, Williams integer has 
all properties of the Blum integer. 
Properties include: 
(i) ( f ) = - l , ( f ) = - l , ( ^ ) = - l , a n d ( f ) = l . 
(ii) Cn) = - 1 . 
问 ( ^ ) = ( f ) ( f ) = 1. 
(iv) For any x G Z；, either one of x, -x,2x or — 2x is in QR^. Any relatively 
prime residue x (i.e. x G Z*) will be of type 1: ( Z ( ! ’ ” or Z(_i ,_i ) ) if and 
only if 2x is not. 
(v) When ax G QRn where a is either 1, -1, 2 or -2, then hx G QNR^ for 
b + a, and b is either 1, -1, 2 or -2. 
From the above properties, it is easy for us to find a value which belongs to 
QRn. The procedure is as below: 
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a) choose any x G Z*, 
b) find out the value of a for a = 1, - 1 , 2 or —2 such that ( y ) = 1 and ( f ) = 1. 
Then, this ax G QRn. This is easy provided that we know p and q. 
However, if we only know x and n without obtaining p and q, then we can 
only know that 
1. whether (^) is equal to 1, and 
2. if (^) = 1, then a: is in type 1: (Z(i,i) or Z(_i ,_i)) . 
Thus, we have 1/2 chance to guess correctly that whether x belongs to QRn or 
not. 
Quadratic Residues, Legendre Symbol, Jacobi Symbol, Blum Integer and 
Williams Integer are useful for reading chapter 6. 
2.8 The Quadratic Residuosity Problem 
Definition The Quadratic Residuosity Problem (QRP) is defined as 
given an odd composite integer n and a G Jn, decide whether or not a is a 
quadratic residue modulo n. 
If n is prime, it is easy to solve by checking with Legendre symbol that if 
(^) = 1- If n is a product of 2 primes: p and q, then a G QRn if and only if 
a G QRp and a G QRq. However, if the factorization of n is unknown, then there 
is no efficient procedure known for solving QRP, other than guessing the answer. 
If n = pq, then the probability of a correct guess is | since \QRn\ = lQRJ. It is 
believed that QRP is as difficult as the problem of factoring integers. 
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2.9 The Factorization Problem 
Definition Given a positive integer n, find its prime factorization; that is write 
n = p\^p^2 . • ‘ P^k where the piS are pairwise distinct primes and each e{ > 1. 
The factoring problem is one of the oldest in number theory and the difficulty 
of factoring large numbers are employed to the security of many cryptographic 
algorithms. Protocols that are based on the difficulty of factoring usually require 
that the prime factors are at least 512 bits and preferably larger than 1024 bits^, 
since factoring a lower order of the numbers is well within the reach of today's 
computing machinery. For textbook treatment of efficient factoring algorithms, 
see [Rie85] and [MVOV97 . 
2.10 The Discrete Logarithm Problem 
Definition Given a prime p, a generator a of Z * , and an element |3 G Z * , find 
the integer x, 0 < x < p — 2, such that /? = a^. This can be easily generalized 
to the problem in any finite cyclic group G [MVOV97 . 
It is a hard problem to obtain the discrete logarithm of j3 when the order is 
large. In particular, there is no known polynomial-time algorithm for the discrete 
logarithm problem (DLP). Methods for solving the DLP in one group do not 
necessarily apply in other groups. Therefore, the difficulty of DLP depends upon 
the group used for arithmetic. 
The security of many cryptosystems depends on the intractability of the 
discrete logarithm problem in a multiplicative group Z ; . Examples include E1-
Gamal encryption and signature scheme [ElG85], Digital Signature Algorithm 
1 www.rsa.com / rsalabs / newfaq/q48. html 
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(DSA)2 and Diffie-Hellman key agreement [DH76]. There are some other public-
key cryptosystems whose security rests on discrete logarithm problem in elliptic 
curve groups (ECDLP) [Mil86, MV90]. In these papers, no new cryptographic 
algorithm was invented, but they implemented existing public-key algorithms, 
such as Diffie-Hellman and ElGamal, in elliptic curves over finite fields. 
An Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem (ECC) is elliptic curve analogues of cryp-
tosystems based on the DLP in Z* . This analogue cryptosystem is just like its 
counterparts in Z* , but with all computations performed in an elliptic curve 
group instead of in Z * . 
ECDLP appears to be more difficult to solve than in the group Z* (DLP). De-
tailed description and implementation analysis can be consulted from [Men93 . 
2.11 One-way Functions 
Definition Given x, it is easy to compute f{x); but given f{x), it is compu-
tationally infeasible to find x. 
Basically, it is an invertible function. Also, the above definition can be 
made more precise by requiring easy to mean computable in polynomial time 
while computationally infeasible to mean requiring exponential time. We refer 
computationally infeasible to a problem which would take millions of years to 
compute even if all the computers in the world were assigned to it. At present, 
it is not known whether one-way functions exist, although there are several 
candidate one-way functions. 
2NIST FIPS 186 (csrc.nist.gov/fips/fipsl86.ps) 
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A trap-door one-way function is a one-way function with additional prop-
erty that given some extra information called trapdoor, it becomes feasible to 
find X from given f{x). 
2.12 Blind Signature 
We are quite familiar with the term Dig i ta l S ignature (refer to [Sch94] §2.6 
Digital Signatures). One main feature holds for all digital signature protocols 
is that the signers always know what they are signing. On the contrary, there are 
times when we want a s igner to sign a document for a sender but prevent the 
signer to observe the message it signs. Hence, it is later unable to associate the 
signed message with the sender. This technique is dreadfully used in electronic 
cash scheme to provide user anonymity since the introduction by David Chaum 
in [Cha83 . 
The scheme is established based on the assumption of existence of a commu-
tative style public key system. Also, an untraceable payment system was built 
as an application by the presented blind signature technique. Chaum further de-
veloped blind signature protocols in [Cha88] based on RSA [RSA78]. Many other 
references including [Cha83, Cha85, Cha88] are worthy to be consulted. Another 
typical application of blind signature technique on untraceable electronic cash 
system could later be found in [CFN90]. An online literature [Cha92]^ can also 
be found. 
The concept of a blind signature can be illustrated by an example taken from 
the familiar world of paper documents. The paper analog of a blind signature 
3http: //ganges.cs.tcd.ie/mepeirce/Project/Chaum/sciam.html 
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can be implemented with carbon paper lined envelopes. Writing a signature 
on the outside of such an envelope leaves a carbon copy of the signature on a slip 
of paper within the envelope. This example is first referred by David Chaum 
in [Cha85]. 
About implementation, the process consists of three basic transformations: 
1) blinding by the sender, 
2) signing by the signer, and 
3) unblinding by the sender. 
Cite Chaum's blind signature protocol as an implementation example, we assume 
there is a sender, Alice requests a signature of signer, Bob on a blinded message, 
m. It uses the RSA algorithm. Let B has a public key, e, a private key, d, and 
a public modulus, n. 
Step 1 Alice randomly chooses a value k called blinding factor which satisfies 
1 < k < n and gcd(n, k) = 1. Alice computes m* 二 fce^ mod n and sends 
this to Bob. 
Step 2 Bob computes <s* = (m*y mod n and sends back to Alice. 
Step 3 Alice computes s = k'^s^ mod n and the result should be 5 = m^ mod 
n. This is Bob's signature on m. 
The protocol described above is called Completely Blind Signature and can 
only be operated under a mutual trust environment. 
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Problem In an application of electronic cash scheme, a customer requests the 
bank to blindly sign a number of his coin, which is defined to denote a million 
dollars, but the customer claims that it's the number for denoting 10 dollars 
only. Since the bank cannot observe the number and doesn't sure whether the 
number is the claimed one, the customer can play such trick successfully. 
The possibilities are endless and the completely blind signature protocol isn't 
particularly useful in the field of electronic cash. To provide solution against 
this problem, we need other techniques to incorporate with the blind signature 
protocol. One of those techniques is called cut-and-choose methodology. 
2.13 Cut-and-choose Methodology 
The technique, cut-and-choose is named because of its similarity to a classic 
protocol for dividing anything fairly: 
1) Alice cuts a cake in half. 
2) Bob chooses one of the halves for himself. 
3) Alice takes the remaining half. 
In many electronic cash scheme, cut-and-choose methodology is mainly used to 
solve the problem stated in last section. The heart of this methodology can be 
explained by the following example: 
1) Alice prepares ten messages, each message denotes the same denomination 
that she wants to withdraw but with a different serial number inside it. 
2) She blinds each of these messages with a different blinding factor. And she 
sends the blinded messages to the bank, Bob. 
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3) Bob randomly chooses nine blinded messages and asks Alice for the corre-
sponding blinding factors. 
4) Alice sends Bob the appropriate blinding factors for each of those chosen 
messages. 
5) Bob removes the blinding factors from these nine messages and checks if the 
denominations are all consistent and correct. Also he makes sure that serial 
numbers are different from each other and do not exist in bank's database of 
used serial numbers. 
6) Bob then signs the remaining unrevealed message and sends it back to Alice. 
7) Alice removes the blinding factor and uses this signed coin for purchasing. 
This protocol is secure against Alice cheating. For her to cheat, she would have 
to predict accurately which message Bob would not examine. The odds of her 
doing this are 1/10. To have a better feel of confidence that the odds of Alice's 
being able to find such a pair to be negligibly small, the number of messages that 
Alice sends to Bob can be increased, say 100 messages. Then, the possibility 
that Alice can cheat is down to 1/100. 
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Anatomy and Panorama of 
Electronic Cash 
3.1 Anatomy of Electronic Cash 
The user of credit cards today is an act of faith on the part of all concerned. 
Each party is vulnerable to fraud by the others, and the cardholder in particular 
has no protection against surveillance. On Internet, the problem is even worse 
because no card is required to show up physically during purchasing. Purchasing 
by card is just a providing of card number and card expiration date on Internet. 
Therefore, security is one of the main issues of using credit card. In addition, 
plethora of Internet payment systems have been built based on account-base 
approach (Appendix A) but none of them can provide privacy 一 the way to 
keep buyer's identity secret from the merchants. If we look at our society, to 
keep user's anonymity is one of the significant advantages of the physical cash 
over credit cards. This advantage is also one of the main reasons to explain why 
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the physical cash is still an unbeatable mean of money even the society is rapidly 
migrating to a cashless one. Today, people need more freedom and more self-
determining power. On the contrary, autocrats and large business enterprises 
are becoming more powerful than ever before. They are able to collect a lot of 
personal information of the people and make use to the information in many 
other aspects in which they are interested. 
Consequently, privacy is progressively viewed as an attractive feature in eco-
nomic transactions. Philosophically, the rights of individuals to privacy dictate 
it. On a more pragmatic side, massive compilation and misuse of personal data 
is likely to lead to a general understanding of the danger to privacy originating 
from the lack of anonymity. To give regards to these concerns, we need a pay-
ment mean which can protect the individuals' privacy from those “big brothers" 
during purchasing in electronic commercejust like what physical cash does for 
us today. This is also one of the basic criteria of constructing an electronic cash 
system. In simplicity, we can consider electronic cash is analogous to physical 
cash but it is an electronic form used electronically on computer communications 
networks. 
Before going into a deep discussion of electronic cash, let's see what other 
denotations and nicknames that "electronic cash" has. There is an adage that 
the more up-to-date thing, the more likely it is to be changed. This is also rein-
forced when we try to give a name to this new type of money. Within these few 
years, a heap of synonyms come out for naming it. Early names were replaced 
by later refined names; and many more names are coexisting. Some of them 
are electronic money, digital money, e-cash, digi-cash, or some combinations of 
the words. Over here, I use electronic cash because its crucial feature, user 
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anonymity is analogous with physical cash, in otherwise, its “coins which are 
numbers" which travel through electronic links and computer networks. In 
addition, we called the coins or tokens in an electronic cash system as electronic 
coins. 
3.1.1 Three Functions and Six Criteria 
In its basic form, an electronic cash scheme [Cha85] is a set of cryptographic 
protocols for 
Function 1 a customer to withdraw electronic coins from a bank or a broker; 
(This function is carried out by Withdrawal Protocol. In some schemes 
0 0 9 0 , 0 0 9 2 , Oka95], an Opening Protocol is first invoked before any 
withdrawal protocols are being carried out.) 
Function 2 the customer to use the money to purchase something from a shop 
or a vendor; 
(This function is carried out by Payment Protocol) 
Function 3 the vendor to deposit the money in its bank account or its broker 
account. 
(This function is carried out by Deposit Protocol) 
These three functions delineate the basic working flows of an electronic cash 
scheme and the protocols residing in, which protect the security interests of 
the three parties involved. To construct an ideal electronic cash scheme, the 
following six requirements [0092 ] have to be fulfilled: 
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(a) Independence — The security of electronic cash cannot depend on any phys-
ical condition. Then the cash can be transferred through networks. 
(b) Security — The ability to copy (reuse) and forge the cash must to be pre-
vented. 
(c) Privacy (Untraceability) — The privacy of the user should be protected. 
That is, the relationship between the user and his purchases must be un-
traceable by anyone. 
(d) Off-line payment 一 When a user pays electronic cash to a shop, the proce-
dure between the user and the shop should be executed in an off-line manner. 
That is, the shop does not need to be linked to the host in user's payment 
procedure. 
(e) Transferability — The cash can be transferred to other users. 
( f ) Divisibility 一 One issued piece of cash worth value C (dollars) can be subdi-
vided into many pieces such that each subdivided piece is worth any desired 
value less than C and the total value of all pieces is equivalent to C. 
3.1.2 Untraceable 
To further elaborate the six criteria in previous section, we can first consider the 
paper cash. Paper cash has a significant advantage over credit cards with respect 
to privacy as mentioned before. Although the serial numbers on cash make it 
« 
traceable in principle, paper cash is nearly difficult to be traced in practice. This 
is called conditionally untraceable. Some electronic cash schemes proposed 
Tsi97] can perform unconditional untraceability. 
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Figure 3.1: Online (Broker type) Electronic Cash System 
Unconditional payer untraceability means that even an unlimited pow-
erful bank or an authority cannot identify the identity of a user from provided 
information. Computational untraceability means that the bank or any 
party cannot identify the user by looking into given information unless it can 
make a computation, which is though to be infeasible. 
3.1.3 Online and Off-line 
An electronic cash scheme is said to be "Off-line” [CFN90] if the payment pro-
tocol does not involve the bank or a broker; otherwise the scheme is said to be 
"online" [Cha90, Dam90, PW92, P095] i . To lessen the possibility of confusion 
from computer terminologies, we can also called these scheme as brokerless and 
iwww.w3.org/pub/Conferences/WWW4/Papers/228/ 
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Figure 3.2: Off-line (Brokerless type) Electronic Cash System 
broker type respectively. Figure 3.1 and 3.2 show the working principle of these 
two systems respectively. 
One disadvantage of broker type electronic cash system is that the bank needs 
powerful and expensive computer systems for online verification processes for 
every transaction. Commonly, brokerless type electronic cash scheme is suitable 
for daily low value transactions where accountability afterwards is sufficient 
to deter abuse or where connecting to a broker in real-time is too costly or 
impossible under some conditions. Therefore, a practical system may usually 
operates in dual mode. That is to verify high-cost transactions online in order to 
prevent high-volume fraud; while the bulks of small payments are processed in 
batch mode by the bank. A noticeable online electronic cash system operating 
on Internet is DigiCash's ecash^ which is founded by David Chaum in Holland. 
2www.digicash.com 
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3.1.4 Security 
In the issue of security (criteria (b ) ) , what is to prevent anyone from making 
several copies of an electronic coin and using them at different shops? How can 
we detect whenever there is a counterfeit coin? Paper banknote doesn't present 
this problem, since making exact copies of them is though to be infeasible. Nor 
do credit cards, because their unique identity lets the bank take legal action to 
regain overdrawn balances, and the bank can add cards to a blacklist. Then, 
for electronic cash scheme, online clearing is one possible solution. This solution 
is adopted by credit card system though it's a rather expensive one and it's 
only applicable to online electronic cash systems. For an off-line scheme, the 
bank is not consulted during payment, and hence reuse cannot be prevented. 
However, the customer's identity can be embedded in each coin in a way that 
is accessible if and only if the same coin is used for more than one purchase —— 
double-spending or over-spending. Thus, double-spending can be detected after 
the fact — when the copies of the coin are eventually deposited, the bank will 
learn the identity of the reuser. 
Also, on the issue of proving the existence of secure electronic cash, Damgard 
Dam90] shows that the security of an online electronic scheme using two-party 
computation protocol and zero-knowledge is provable. Some flaws were identified 
and corrected later in [PW92]. Pfitzmann and Waidner also showed how to 
construct a provably secure off-line scheme under the general assumption of the 
existence of trapdoor one-way permutations in a later time. 
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3.1.5 Transferability 
Transferability (criteria (e ) ) of electronic cash means that the payee in one 
payment transaction can spend the received money in a later payment to a third 
person without contacting the bank or another central authority between the 
two transactions. As online electronic payment systems require communication 
with a central authority during the payment transaction, transferability is only 
an issue for off-line systems. Although the ability to transfer "normal" money 
(physical cash such as coins and notes) is very important and can said to be very 
convenient in our daily life, this property has only received very little attention 
in relation to electronic money. 
Transferability is a feature that exists in physical cash but has not been 
applied in electronic cash. The main reason is the danger involved in transferring 
electronic coins and the subsequent increase in liability for the banks issuing 
those coins: an over-spending user is only identified when the coins he spent 
return to the bank; in addition, a single coin can be over-spent by all users 
from whose hands it has passed. The lack of interest in pursuing research or the 
inertia of further development in transferability can also be attributed to the 
facts that 
1. depositing an electronic coin is much more efficient than depositing a phys-
ical token, hence transferability becomes less of an issue, and 
2. a coin grows in size with every transfer, as shown by Chaum and Pedersen 
in [CP92]. This is because transcripts of the previous payments are ap-
pended and must be verified in each payment to prevent double spending 
3. a payer can recognize his money if he sees it later in the chain of payments 
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—forward traceability. 
In [CP92], it not only shows that it is impossible to construct an electronic 
money system providing transferability without the property that the money 
grows when transferred but also can an unlimited powerful user always rec-
ognize his money later. In short, since each transfer requires information to 
prevent double spending and to be able to reveal the identity of double spender, 
the entropy of the transferred coin must increase for adding the information of 
recipient. 
3.2 Panorama of Electronic Cash 
In the evolution of Electronic Cash, there are many devoted classical papers that 
contribute to this area a lot. 
3.2.1 First Model of Off-line Electronic Cash 
First off-line anonymous electronic cash scheme was introduced by Chaum, Fiat 
and Naor in [CFN90]. Security of their scheme relied on some arbitrary assump-
tions however no formal proof was attempted. Although hardly practical, their 
system demonstrated how off-line e-cash can be constructed and laid the foun-
dation for more secure and efficient schemes to follow. Their methodology was 
conceptually simple. At withdrawal, the bank verifies in a zero-knowledge man-
ner that the user's identity is "embedded" (encrypted) in a randomly created (by 
the user) coin. Then it provides the user with a blind signature on this coin. At 
payment, the user provides a distinct "hint" on his identity, such that one hint 
provides one computationally secure and unconditionally blinded commitment 
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on the user's identity, whereas any two hints can identify the user. Hints are 
verifiable by the shop, i.e., a zero-knowledge proof that the hint corresponds to 
the identity in the coin is given. At deposit, the shop just transfers a payment 
transcript to the bank. Upon double spending of a coin, the bank identifies the 
user using the two distinct "hints" on his identity. The zero-knowledge proofs 
during withdrawal and payment were using the cut-and-choose methodology (see 
section 2.13). 
It's the first off-line untraceable electronic cash system which satisfies criteria 
(a) to (d) stated in section 3.1.1 based on cut-and-choose methodology and a 
collision free one-way hash function technique [Sch94]. 
3.2.2 Successors 
Evolution of e-cash system [0090] proposed another similar one, which satisfies 
criteria (a) to (e). It used disposable zero-knowledge authentication scheme in 
place of collision free function. They made the first attempt to improve the First 
Model described in the previous section. 
Although the cut-and-choose technique is still employed, the main evolution 
was to introduce one more step before Withdrawal Protocol, called Opening Pro-
tocol (account establishment). This step carries out the most complex part of 
the functionality of the previous withdrawal protocol, namely the zero-knowledge 
proof of the user's identity. Opening protocol provides user an untraceable "li-
cense". Thus, anonymity is established only once, in the form of a pseudonym, 
instead of being "refreshed" with every withdrawn coin. However, this scheme 
does not satisfy perfect untraceability, although it satisfies linkable untraceabil-
ity. That is, the relationship between a user and his purchases cannot be traced 
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by anyone, but a purchase history of an anonymous user can be traced. Such 
linkability of user's coins may even cause users to be traced with conventional 
techniques, (i.e., using locality, time, type, size, frequency of payments, or by 
finding a single payment in which the user identified himself.) Hence, a compro-
mise between the efficiency and the unlinkability of the system can be found by 
running the account-establishment protocol more than once. 
3.2.3 Binary Tree Based Divisible Electronic Cash 
In [0092] , Okamoto and Ohta first proposed the six criteria (Criteria (a) to 
( f ) ) of an ideal untraceable electronic cash and also their scheme is the first 
one which satisfies all those six criteria. As claimed by the authors, the total 
data transfer for a payment is about 20kB, and the protocol can be completed 
in several seconds, assuming the existence of a Rabin scheme [MVOV97] chip. 
The security of this scheme relies on difficulty of factoring (section 2.9). Key 
techniques are the square root modulo N {N is a Williams Integer). Divisibility 
is achieved by using binary tree structure table and is manipulated in quadratic 
residues properties. 
Okamoto proposed another version in [Oka95] several years later. This 
scheme adopts single term cash scheme which uses bit commitment in place 
of cut-and-choose methodology. The divisibility of electronic coin is realized 
by a similar approach as [ 0 0 9 2 . 
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Spending Limit Enforced 
Electronic Cash 
In this chapter, a new fundamental concept on untraceable divisible off-line 
electronic cash is proposed. It is called Spending Limit Enforced Electronic 
Cashi . A scheme, for realizing this concept, is also presented. 
4.1 Introduction to Spending Limit Enforced 
Electronic Cash 
Among the various kinds of off-line electronic cash schemes proposed since the 
introduction by Chaum, Fiat and Noar [CFN90], most efforts have been devoted 
to fulfill the requirements of security, privacy, complexity and coin divisibility. 
A big heap of improved schemes have been proposed and there are noticeable 
iThis concept and scheme plus another research result called Interest-bearing Elec-
tronic Cash presented in the next chapter are evolved with the crucial inspirations and 
involvement of Prof. Wei. 
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achievements established among these stringent requirements. However, there is 
no limitation of how many tokens a customer can spend per day or per month. 
The customer simply spends all the withdrawn tokens until all of them have 
been used up. There isn't any limitation on daily or monthly total expenditure. 
In this report, we are going to change the perception on electronic cash by 
offering a new fundamental concept. 
Concept This is a fundamental concept which imposes a daily or monthly 
spending limit to each divisible electronic coin. For each of such coins, the 
amount spent within one day or one month could not exceed the corresponding 
spending limit. 
One application evolved can be delineated as there is a child who gets a sum 
of electronic cash from his parents at the beginning of each month. However, in 
each day, he can only spend a small portion of the money. This daily spending 
limit is enforced by the electronic cash scheme. 
Our implementation uses a direct construction of coin numbers instead of 
cut-and-choose methodology (see section 2.13) during coin withdrawal. Also, a 
single term challenge-response secret sharing line technique [Fer94, Sha79l is 
used instead of multiple terms challenge-response scheme for detecting double 
spending during payment for higher efficiency. 
The secret sharing line technique is an extension of [Fer94], which uses a 
2-dimensional secret sharing line to enforce double spending detection, is first 
introduced by Shamir in [Sha79]. The central idea of Ferguson's scheme is to ask 
the user to give a share of his identity to the shop at each payment in response 
to a random challenge. This share is a point on the line x h^ ax + U where 
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a is a constant chosen randomly by the user and is secretly kept as a secret 
sharing parameter . U is the user's identity which is distinct for each coin. If 
the user spends the same coin twice, he has to reveal a second point on the line 
— t h e second share of his identity. With these two points, the values of a and 
U can be recovered by the banks easily and the double spender's identity, U, is 
also revealed. 
This technique gets rid of large number of challenge-response terms and 
Ferguson uses this technique to detect double spending. In [Fer94], an algorithm 
to prevent double spending of an non-divisible coin was shown. Let each coin is 
represented by 3 base numbers: a, b, c. Alice (the user) constructs 
^ = fa{a) (4.1) 
B = fb{b) (4.2) 
C = /c (c ) (4.3) 
where f{a,b,c} are appropriate one-way functions. A, B and C are called the 
fingerprint of the 3 corresponding base numbers of the coin. Let U be Alice's 
identity and k is generated randomly by Alice and is called secret sharing 
line parameter. Alice gets 2 RSA-signatures from the bank by blind signature 
scheme (see section 2.12) so that bank don't know the values of her base numbers. 
The 2 signatures are 
^1 = ( C ^ 4 ) i " (mod a ) (4.4) 
and 52 =(fiUBy/v (mod a) (4.5) 
where v and a are bank's public exponent and modulus respectively, v should 
be a reasonably large prime (say 128 bits). 
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During payment, Alice sends the base numbers (a, b, c) to shop. The shop 
randomly chooses a challenge number, x and sends back to Alice. Alice computes 
the share of her identity, r as 
r = kx + U (mod v) (4.6) 
and a signature by 
S = Sf • S2 (4.7) 
and sends (r, S) to the shop. 
The shop constructs back A, B and C from the base numbers and then check 
广 = { C ^ A ^ B ) . (4.8) 
Since the challenge-response pair (a:,r) only reveals one point (one share of 
Alice's identity) on the line 
X M- kx + U, (4.9) 
the shop cannot know the value of U, Alice's identity. However, if this coin is 
spent twice, Alice has to reveal another point on the line x h^ kx + U provided 
that the value of x is different from that of the first time. These 2 points let 
the bank to recover the value of U once these 2 transactions have reached bank 
from the shops. 
In our implementation scheme, we will construct an extension of this tech-
nique to realize an unit of time spending limit enforced electronic cash. 
In the next section, we first describe the brief protocol of a scheme to realize 
the concept by leaving the detailed techniques untouched till later sections. 
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4.2 The Scheme 
We use the term, unit of time spending limit, to replace daily or monthly 
spending limit for maintaining generality. To ease explanation, we assume the 
spending limit for each time unit of a coin is constant first. It is easy to extend 
the scheme to support variable spending limits among different time units and 
this will be elaborated later in this chapter. Let there is a coin worth N dol-
lars. It can be used over T units of time and its unit of time spending limit is 
M dollars/unit of time. To make the coin be able to have all its value be spent 
within the T time units, we assume that N < MT. We first represent this coin 
by two sets of base numbers: 
S = {e i ,e2 , - - - ,e iv+i ,e ;v+2} 
r 1T 
少 = [ P l P2 . • • Pr 
where Pi = {hj \ j = 1 , . . . , M + 2 } for i = 1, • . . , T. E is called c o i n base 
n u m b e r set which is used to preventing coin over-spending and $ is used to 
imposing unit time limitation on expenditure and also to enforce coin expira-
tion feature. There are T rows of number sets in $ , each row Pi is a t i m e 
base number set, used to confine every specific time unit's spending limit to 
M dollars/unit of time. 
Assume there are appropriate one-way functions f(-)s for these base numbers 
such that 
Et = f e i { e i ) f o r i = l r . , y v + 2 (4.lO) 
Lzj =fi”(h) for< = l,-..，T^;j = l ’ . . . ’ M + 2 (4.11) 
During withdrawal, the user, Alice first obtains two sets of random numbers 
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as her secret sharing line parameters: 
{ci I i = l , . . . , A / " } and 
M). |z = V . . , r ; j = l r . . , M } 
and also the corresponding RSA-signatures which are blindly signed by the bank 
in a direct construction which will be explained in details in section 4.4. 
Sc�=购+拟丨” foTi = l,...,N (4.12) 
ScN,i = ( 唤 而 + 1 ) 1 " (4.13) 
Sd�3 = ( 4 ' M + 2 ) ^ ) ' ^ ' for i = 1 , . . . ’ T; j = 1,. •., M (4.14) 
^(M+i) = ( L ^ k T + 2 ) ^ v m ) ) " " for i = 1 , . . •，T (4.15) 
where Uc and Ui are user's identity of the coin and of the time unit i respectively. 
All computations are done in an RSA system [RSA78] where the bank knows 
the factorization of modulus a. The corresponding public exponent of this RSA 
system is v. 
During payment, we first assume Alice only spends 1 dollar on ith time 
unit to ease description. Herewith, we show a one-move protocol for achieving 
better efficiency (see Figure 4.1). 
Alice first generates two random numbers a , , a i ^n K and computes two 
challenge numbers by 
^e = HeimisWa, ) (4.16) 
1^ = ^i(Pi\\h\\ai) (4.17) 
where He and Hi are two hash functions; and 1^  is the identity of the shop, 
Bob. Then, she computes two corresponding responses r^ and r/ which are her 
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Alice Shop 
^ I_S  
ae,a/ en Z* 
Xe = 7ie{^\\Is\\o^e) 
xi = ni(Pi\\Is\\ai) 
re = CiX^ + C2a;f-l + h CNXe + U� 
ri = d,ix^ + di2xf^-i + ... + diMXi + Ui 
C _ Q^e CX^-' . • . QXe C ^e — ^ci C^2^  ^CN^N+i 
Sl = ^ 1 ^dL ' " ^ d L ^ ( M + i ) 
(S,P,), (ae,aQ, (re,ri),(S,,Si) 
Ei 二 /e.(eO for i = 1, • . . , N + 2 
^u = Aj(^ij) for i = 1, . . . , r； j = 1,..., M + 2 
Xe = ne(misWa,) 
xi = ni(P^\\Is\\ai) 
S:lEr&Ef...E^N+i 
7 jvf 
^1 二 ^i(M+2)^a . . . L^M^M+1 
Figure 4.1: A brief illustration of one-move Payment Protocol. 
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identity shares and two signatures Se and Si corresponding to x^ and xi as 
below: 
re = Cia;f + c:2a;f-i + . . . + CAra:e + t/c (4.18) 
r/ = " i i z ^ + c^i2a^^-i + . " + c/iMa:/ + 7^i (4.19) 
Se = S : � S : r � S : ; S c N + i (4.20) 
Si = � h r � � 4 ( M + ” ( 4 . 2 1 ) 
Alice sends the coin (E,Pi ) , challenge numbers (ae ,a / ) , corresponding identity 
shares (rg,r/) and signatures (Se,Si) to Bob. When Bob receives, he verifies 
the consistency of all the parameters. If the transaction requires Alice to spend 
more than 1 dollar, the above steps are to be repeated for every spending of 1 
dollar. Note that Bob has to check that all a^ and a； are different and uniquely 
generated for every spend of 1 dollar. 
4.3 An Example 
For a coin worth $10 and the minimum divisible unit is $1. The coin will be 
expired after 1 year and there is a monthly spending limit imposed as $2 per 
month. Then, the two sets of base numbers that representing the coin would 
be: 
S = { e i , e 2 , - " , e i i , e i 2 } 
^ = [ Pl P2 … P u f 
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where Pi = {hj | j = 1，• • .，4} for i = 1，•..，12. Also, the following equations 
are constructed for this coin. 
Ei = /e,(ei) f o r i = l , " . , 1 2 (4.22) 
Lij = fUj{hj) for i = 1 , . . . ’ 12; j = 1，•. . , 4 (4.23) 
During withdrawal, Alice first obtains her secret sharing line parameters 
as: 
{ci |z' = l , - . . , 1 0 } and 
and {dij |i = l , " . ， 1 2 ; j = l ’ . . .，2} 
and also the corresponding RSA-signatures: 
^c. = m E i Y � forz = l , . . . , 1 0 (4.24) 
^cn = (丑 &五 1 1 ) 1 " (4.25) 
� ={ L ^ ^ L , j f ' forz = l , . . . , 1 2 ; j = l , . . . , 2 (4.26) 
c^^ .3 = ( ^ k ) i " fo“ = l , . . . , 1 2 . (4.27) 
During payment (see Figure 4.2), Alice first generates two random numbers 
ae and a/, and computes the two challenge numbers by x^ = 7^(S||/s||ae) and 
Xi = ni{Pi\\Is\\oii)- Then, she computes two corresponding responses re and r； 
and two signatures Se and Si as below: 
e^ = C i x f + C2X^+-- . + CioXe + t/c (4.28) 
n = diixJ + di2Xi + Ui (4.29) 
Se = 5 ; f & L . 5 < c 2 5 < e i i (4.30) 
2 
Si = ^ 1 ^ 2 ^ 3 (4.31) 
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Alice Bob 
^ h  
OLe,OLl ^n ^1 
X, = Ue[WsWae) 
XI = Ui(PiWIsWc^i) 
Ve = Cixl^ + C2xl H h CioXe + Uc 
r/ = diix^ + di2X1 + Ui 
Se = Sci Sc2 . . . ^ o ^ c i i 
Sl = ^,'i ^2 知3 
( E , P O , ( a e , g / ) , (re,rQ, {S , ,S i ) 
Ei = fe,(ei) forz. = l , . . . , 1 2 
Lij = fhj{Uj) for i = 1 , . . . , 12； j = 1,.. .,4 
x. = ne{misWa,) 
xi = ni(P,Wmai) 
^ = E-Er"...E-En 
QV 1. T^l T^l TXi r 
^1 - ^i4^il ^i2^3 
Figure 4.2: A monthly spending limit enforced electronic coin. 
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Alice sends the coin (S ,P i ) , challenge numbers (ae ,a / ) , corresponding identity 
shares (rg, r/) and signatures (S'g, Si) to Bob for verification. 
4.4 Techniques 
Now, we can delve in the details of withdrawal protocol which uses a tech-
nique called direct construction. The direct construction which builds the 
withdrawal protocol for high efficiency. For those base number sets, S and Pi 
{i = 1 , . . . ’ T) , each of them follows a similar procedure of direct construction to 
obtain the secret sharing parameters ( { c , } , { d i j } ) and corresponding signatures 
{ {Sc , ]ASd , j } ) ' The withdrawal protocol (see Figure 4.3) can be concluded as 
n + 2 parallel runs of randomized blind signature scheme for each set of base 
numbers. 
Here below is the direct construction protocol to construct a base number 
set {ci I i = 1,.. •，n + 2}, the secret sharing line parameters {a,- | i = 1,..., ^ } 
and corresponding signatures {Si | i = 1 ’ . •., n + 1} (Note that the notations in 
this section are selected differently from the previous sections for maintaining 
generality). 
Step 1. Alice starts by choosing three sets of random numbers : 
1. Alice's contributions to the base numbers 
c i , 4 r - - , < + 2 ^n K 
2. exponential blinding factors 
"i,/t^2,. • .,A^n+2 ^n ^v 
3. multiplicative blinding factors 
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Alice Bank 
c'i,4,.-.’�2 6n ^1 
/Wl ,^2 , • • . ,/^n+2 ^n ^v 
A,A,-",/^n+2 en K 
l ^ M < ' | z = l , . . . , n + 2} 
<,4',...,<+2 6n K 
{<h = lr.,n}, /^ ¾；, h'jxi 
<^ i,o^ '2r.,<^ k Gn K 
e c n + i i / ( / 4 S i e ^ ) - ^ + i 
ec^,,^f{htxfn-^n^2^ 
Ci — {c[c'l. /2(ec,+1，ec„+2))。； for i = 1 , . . . , n 
ec, — ^ / ( c i ) - |M for i = 1 ’ . . . ’ n 
{^C. I i = l，...,r^}，6cn^l, eCn+2 
^ — K+2C'n+29'c= <^29ZV 
— C M > i [ / ^ ; + i ‘ i C ? i i < + i ^ e : ; r 
CG—/?^^S，<.y^(ec„+"ec„+2)g:; ’ 
for i = 1’ •.. ,n 
" " ” , | . 1 , <o^l-".<^n Z： 
< + l , < + 2 ’ W 丨 z = l ,….,r^} 
{(^丨'.呀"上=1’ . . . , " } 
c - c ' c" ( ^ - W / -
^n+l — C^+l^ n+1  
Cn+2 = 心 2 心 2 
ai = a[a'l (mod v) for i = 1 ’ . . • ’ n 
^ , f{hZtl) 
^n+l <— ^n+l9cn+i 
^ nhZXl) 
� n + 2 <- Cn+29cn+2 
Ci — C i g i ” forz. = V . . , n 
5. — ( ( ^ " ' . ~ ^ i ) ” ” P % A Y ' t for z = 1 , . . . , n 
Sn+1 卜 ( C n + 2 . CWl)l,7"&2"n+l 
s^ = C:!, ,Ci f o r i = l , . . . , n 
巧 + 1 二 ^ n + 2 ^ ^ + l 
Figure 4.3: Withdrawal Protocol Using Direct Construction 
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A,ft,.--,/9n+2 e^  Z； 
Alice then computes {|3^c^g^; | i = 1 , . . • ’ n + 2 } and sends the computation 
results to the bank where "c,s are publicly known elements of large order 
in Z ; . 
Step 2. The bank chooses its contributions to the base numbers 
�;',-..,<+2 &n K 
C" " 
It then sends {c'； | i = l , - . . , w } , hdH m o d p and /1¾^ m o d p to Alice 
where p is a prime congruent to 1 modulo a, and /i^ n+i and /ic„+2 are 
publicly known elements of order a in Fp. 
Step 3. Alice chooses a set of random numbers 
• ' 2 , - . ， < €7e Z： 
and computes the corresponding exponents by 
� i = / ( / 4 S ! ‘ i ) - " „ + i (4.32) 
and � + 2 = / ( " & f % 2 ) - " n + 2 (4.33) 
where / ( . ) is a suitable one-way function mapping Z； into Z^. She also 
computes the set of base numbers as 
Ci = ( c ; < . / 2 ( e c „ + " e c „ + 2 ) ) a : f o r i = l , . . . , n (4.34) 
where /2(-) is another one-way function that makes a depend on ec„+i and 
6cn+2 • She also computes the corresponding exponents of a as 
^c. = i [ / ( c i ) - fM for i = 1，• •., n (4.35) 
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Note that all calculations of the exponents are done in modulo v. Alice 
then sends all the exponents to the bank. 
Step 4. The bank computes the blinded version of {Ci | i = 1 , . . . , n + 2 } as 
^ = /^ n%i4+i<V/c^ +i^ :::t^  (4.36) 
^ = K^2cU29L^:^<^29ZlV (4.37) 
^ = A M " c " M ' . / 2 ( e c „ + ” e c „ + 2 k ? forf = l , " . , n (4.38) 
Then, the bank chooses a set of random numbers a'/, a'2',. •., a " ^n ^1 
and sends < + ” <+2, Wi I ^ = l , . . . , n } , {{C^'-C^y/^ | i = l ’ . . . , n }， 
and { C ^ ^ . ^ ) i " to Alice. 
Step 5. Alice computes the two remaining base numbers c^+i and Cn+2 as 
Cn+i<+i and <+2<+2 respectively. Also, she constructs the secret sharing 
line parameters {ai | i = 1 ’ . . . ’ n} as a^ = a;a; ' (mod ” ) . Then, she can 
construct the numbers Cn+i and Cn+2 as c^+i5'4+r^'^ and c^+2i^4+r^"^ 
respectively, also Ci as 0,_双/产.）foj. i 二 i ’ . •.,打 and the signatures as 
& 二 （ ( ^ ' ; ' . ^ " 7 " : i 2 A r ; forz = l , . . . , n (4.39) 
Sn+1 = {Cn+2 . C V K ) l , 7 " ^ A i + l (4.40) 
Alice finally checks that the signatures she received are correct. After 
withdrawal, Alice obtained a base number set {ci | i = l , . . . , n + 2 } , 
secret sharing line parameters {ai \ i = 1 , . . - , n } and the signatures {Si 
i = 1,.. -,n + 1}. 
50 
Chapter 4 Spending Limit Enforced Electronic Cash 
4.5 Security and Efficiency 
In the payment protocol, if Alice has spent rj dollars (1 < rj < N) of a coin which 
is worth N dollars, Alice should sends to shops rj sets of challenge numbers and 
her identity shares {(a^efc,^eJ, {^h^^h) I ^ = 1 , . . . ’ " } which will eventually be 
sent to the bank. Now, if the coin is challenged to a total of more than N times, 
b u t � N + 1) times, in a case of overspending as an example, Alice must provides 
(A^+1) pairs of challenge numbers and identity shares {{xe^,re^) | k = 1’...，N+ 
1} which reveals (A^ + 1) points on the line x^ h^ ctia:f + Q2a:f"^H Vc^nXe^Uc 
that immediately allow the bank to determine her identity U � T h u s , in this 
scheme, we use N + 2 coin base numbers, S, to represent a coin which is worth 
N dollars and a corresponding {N + l)-dimensional secret sharing line to detect 
overspending. 
In addition, we use another set of base numbers, ¢ , which has T rows of 
time base numbers, to enforce unit of time spending limit on the coin. For 
each row of ¢ , Pi, this particular set of base numbers imposes an expenditure 
limitation up to M dollars for each time unit by using the same technique. 
Also, for each unit of time, only a specific row of $ for that time unit, Pi, can 
be used. This can be guaranteed by using different bank signing key for each 
different time unit. Thus, the coin cannot be used after T time units since no 
Pi for i > T exists. This enforces coin expiration automatically. As noted, S 
and $ are basically independent and thus they can be implemented by using 
different schemes. As an example, overspending can be detected by various 
kinds of divisible electronic cash schemes proposed such as binary-tree divisible 
electronic cash schemes proposed in [0092] , [E094] and [Oka95]. In addition, 
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since each Pi is independent to other PjS for i + j, the number of time base 
numbers in P{ is not necessarily equal to the number of all other Pjs\ This can 
be utilized to impose a variable unit of time spending limit to an electronic coin. 
It also implies that for a coin worth N dollar, the unit of time spending limit 
for time unit i is Mi and the coin can lasts for T time units. Then 
T 
N < Y . M , (4.41) 
i=l 
and the time base number set would be modified as Pi = { “ j | i = 1 ’ . . .，Mi + 2 } 
for i = 1 , . . .,T. The subsequent protocols described in section 4.2 have to be 
modified accordingly. 
If we look into the efficiency, the identification of double spenders requires 
multiple terms for each coin in most of the earlier schemes. Each term is used 
to answer one bit of challenge from the shop during payment. If both possible 
answers for any term is ever given, the user's identity is revealed. To achieve an 
acceptable probability of detection, a large number of terms is required. In this 
scheme, only one pair of challenge-response term is performed for spending each 
dollar. This single term payment scheme is much more efficiency than those 
previously proposed schemes. In addition, the direct construction methodology 
employed in withdrawal protocol gets rid of k time cut-and-choose methodology. 
The degree of efficiency improvement is as high as the factor of k. 
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Interest-bearing Electronic Cash 
In this chapter, another concept on untraceable divisible off-line electronic cash 
is proposed. It is called Interest-bearing Electronic Cash. This concept is 
to impose an interest rate on the balance of each divisible electronic cash. It is 
a sequel of previous chapter in implementation. 
5.1 Introduction to Interest-bearing Electronic 
Cash 
Currently proposed electronic cash systems are more or less the debit type with-
out exception — no interest borne on the electronic cash. Debit type systems are 
easily associated with debit cards including phone cards, transportation cards 
and bankcards and none of them does bear interest. In essence, those debit cards 
require the customer to pay the card issuer (e.g. the bank) a sum of money in 
advance. The issuer takes the money, issues debit card and clears purchases 
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when they are requested. But at any time, the issuer does not pay any inter-
est onto the balance of the cards. Analogously, if a user withdraws electronic 
cash from a bank, the bank deducts the amount from his account and issues 
electronic cash which most often will be spent in token form. The money is 
deducted from the user's bank account prior any expenditure of the electronic 
tokens and the bank does not pay any interest in the means of extra tokens to 
the balance of electronic cash. But if we look at other side by reviewing various 
kinds of accounts of bank systems, conventional current accounts do not bear 
interest while savings accounts bear interest. This paper is going to change the 
perception on electronic cash by offering a new fundamental concept and by 
presenting a construction of an interest-bearing electronic cash system. 
Concept To impose an interest rate on the balance of each divisible electronic 
coin. 
In the new conceptual scheme, interest is imposed on the balance of electronic 
coins at the end of certain period. For positive interest rate, the user's electronic 
coins are just like to be stored inside his savings account and there is interest 
added into his account at the end of each month with regard to his account's 
balance. 
About implementation, this scheme uses the same technique as described in 
last chapter. It uses a single term, secret sharing line technique, and a direct 
construction instead of cut-and-choose methodology. Also, a single term secret 
sharing line scheme is used instead of multiple terms challenge-response scheme 
for detecting double-spending during payment. 
As these two schemes we are using compatible protocols. We will finally 
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show how to simultaneously impose unit of time spending limit features that we 
discussed in last chapter with interest-bearing feature on the electronic coins by 
using a similar direct construction. 
5.2 An Example 
Herewith, I bring in an example first for describing how an interest-bearing 
electronic cash system behaves. 
For example, Alice withdraws $100 from the bank where the minimum di-
visible unit for this system is $1. In the first month, Alice spends $40. At the 
end of the month, there is an interest rate of 10% imposed to her electronic cash 
balance. Thus, $6 is added to her balance which is summed up to $66. During 
the second month, she awards an increase of the interest rate to 20% due to some 
sorts of incentive and it is applied to her electronic cash balance by the end of 
this month. If she only spends $1 in the second month, her new balance will be 
$78 at the beginning of third month. This scheme associates many other appli-
cations. Besides the conventional positive interest rate imposed on the balance, 
a negative interest rate can be applied to stimulate the usage of electronic cash 
as an example. Below is the description of a scheme which uses the generalized 
withdrawal and payment protocols presented previously. 
5.3 The Scheme 
We use same notations as that in the last chapter for easy expression and also 
declare some new symbols for extra parameters without losing generality. Let 
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Alice withdraws a coin which is worth W dollars. It is represented by a set of 
base numbers S = {ci | i = 1,. • - ,n + 2} where n is pre-defined during the 
coin withdrawal such that ^ = Ai where Ai is the number of secret sharing 
points should be revealed for spending one dollar in the first time period. Let 
Ci = fc,(ci) (i = 1,. • . , n + 2) where /c,(.)s are suitable one-way functions and 
Ci is a corresponding fingerprint of c,-. During withdrawal, Alice obtains (n + 1) 
RSA-signatures from the bank, S^ = {S"i, S2 , . . . ’ S'^+i}, where 
^ = K U C ^ Y ' ' f o r j = l , . . . ,n (5.1) 
and 5Wi = ( C ^ ^ 2 ^ W i ) " " (5.2) 
for {aj I j = l , . . . , w } is a set of random numbers as her secret sharing 
line parameters and U is Alice's identity. The detailed direct construction 
technique for forming the base number set S, secret sharing parameters {a^ } 
and the signature set S^ can be referred to section 4.4. 
During the first time period, we assume that Alice pays Bob 1 dollar. Alice 
needs to reveal Ai secret sharing points to Bob and this process can be described 
as below: 
Step 1. The process is started when Alice sends the coin number set 
S = {ci I i = l,...,n + 2} 
to Bob. 
Step 2. Bob sends back a set of randomly chosen non-zero challenge numbers, 
{^k I k = l , . . . , A i } . 
This means that Bob requests Alice to reveal Ai points on the secret-
sharing line for spending of 1 dollar. 
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Step 3. Alice then replies Ai pairs of identity shares and corresponding signa-
tures {(rfc, r&) I k = 1, • •. ’ Ai} as 
^k = aix^ + tt2a^r' + • • • + ^nXk + U (5.3) 
and r , = 5 f S " 2 � - i . . . 6 " J * S W i (5.4) 
Step 4. Finally, Bob verifies the consistency of the responses. 
We let the interest rate be Si at the end of the first time period. Then, the 




Herewith, we assume that (1 + £i)\\i. If not, we need some rounding policies 
to round the value of A2 to the appropriate quantity of the number of secret 
sharing points. The above steps are then repeated with A2 in place of Ai for the 
second time period and so on. 
5.4 Security 
The idea of introducing X{ is to change the number of points required to reveal 
on the secret sharing line for spending one dollar in each different time period. 
Since the overall number ofpoints can be revealed is fixed during coin withdrawal 
and if the remaining amount of the withdrawn coin needs to be changed when 
the time elapses, we should change the number of secret sharing points for each 
dollar accordingly — X{. 
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The whole process is carried out to T cycles such that 
T 
J 2 >^ i^ i < n (5.6) 
i=i 
where tOi is the amount in dollars being spent in zth time period. After T cycles 
being carried out, there are altogether at most n points on the secret sharing 
line 
a^  ^ aia:" + 0t2x^-^ + • • • + a^x + V (5.7) 
having been revealed. Alice's identity is protected from being revealed even if 
there is a collusion of all other parties such as the bank and the shops. However, 
if Alice overspent, she has to reveal more than n points on the line shown above 
(equation 5.7), this immediately allow the bank to determine her identity U 
once all the transactions of this coin have been deposited to the bank from the 
incurred shops. 
In the protocol shown in section 5.3, it shows the two-move protocol, which 
is contrary to one-move protocol presented in section 4.2 of last chapter. Ac-
tually, the interest-bearing electronic cash scheme can also employ one-move 
protocol. It is easy to switch this scheme to the previous version by referring to 
the details of section 4.2. 
5.5 An Integrated Scheme 
Now, we explain the idea to build a single electronic cash system which equips 
all three features — interest-bearing, daily or monthly spending limit and coin 
expiration by associating both interest-bearing and spending limit algorithms. 
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As we notice from section 5.3, the interest-bearing scheme adopts a dynamic 
adjustment to the number of secret sharing points being revealed for spending 
one dollar with regard to the variation of interest rate. While the spending 
limit algorithm sticks to a static construction of the coins which is set during 
withdrawal. Thus, in order to maintain the floating interest rate characteristic, 
we only need to replace E and its followings of the spending limit algorithm by 
that of interest-bearing scheme. The time base number sets P s^ in # and its 
following derivations are remained unchanged. 
5.6 Applications 
For positive interest rate, people would prefer to hold interest-bearing electronic 
cash instead of paper notes and physical coins to lessen from depreciation due to 
sharp inflation. In addition, the electronic cash also provides divisibility besides 
user anonymity. This divisibility feature of electronic cash is even more flexible 
than that of physical cash. Also, it can provide interest to the balance as our 
bank savings account. One advantage of it over the bank savings account is 
that the payment of electronic cash can be performed off-line. Thus, there is 
a potential for electronic cash to replace physical notes and the speed may be 
faster when interest-bearing electronic cash systems are employed in practice to 
such a cashless society. 
For negative interest rate, it can stimulate the usage of electronic coins. This 
feature can be incorporated as an instance into an individual based promotion 
tactic. For example, there is a bank who issues negative interest rate borne 
electronic tokens to its credit card users as bonus points with regard to the 
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amount of credit made by the user. The bank encourages its users to use all 
of the bonus points as quickly as possible with money to buy some promoting 
products. If a user doesn't use the bonus points at once, the bonus points 
will decrease automatically with time. Although the bonus will never expire, 
the quantity will decrease continually with time until vanished at all. This 
individual based credit card bonus point policy is much more flexible than most 
existing schemes adopted by the bank. 
By employing the daily or monthly spending limit feature to the electronic 
cash as well, we can further extend the applications. In the consideration of secu-
rity, we may want to limit the total amount of withdrawn cash in our electronic 
wallets that can be spent within one day or one month. By using unit-of-time 
spending limit enforced electronic cash, we can reduce our loss of electronic cash 
if our electronic wallets were stolen and misused. 
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Abacus Type Electronic Cash 
In this chapter, I dwells on a new divisible cash structure concept. I name it 
as Abacus because of its similar nature to a kind of Chinese calculating tools, 
Abacus. An Abacus type divisible untraceable off-line (brokerless) electronic 
cash scheme can be used to improve the efficiency of a conventional binary tree 
type electronic cash system [DC95, E094, 0 0 9 2 , Oka95, Pai93] for daily usage. 
Furthermore, this proposing scheme shows a significant improvement on the part 
of Opening Protocol (refer to section 3.1.1). In this chapter, the concept is 
first described and then realized. Finally, how such Abacus type electronic cash 
system be more efficient than the previous versions is discussed. 
6.1 Introduction 
In recent years, many researches on the aspect of electronic coin divisibility 
have been conducted by using different cryptographic techniques [Pai93, Bra94, 
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DC95, E094, 0 0 9 0 , 0 0 9 2 , Oka95]. Okamoto presented a “single-term divisi-
ble" scheme in [Oka95], which was the most efficient one among those papers. A 
"Single-term" cash scheme [CFN90, E094, Oka95] means that cash consists of a 
single term where cut-and-choose method is not used. Divisibility [0092] refers 
to a piece of electronic cash in a given amount can be subdivided into many 
pieces such that each subdivided piece is worth any desired value less than the 
original cash and the total value of all pieces is equivalent to the original one. 
The scheme consists of four main protocols: 
a) Opening Protocol 
b) Withdrawal Protocol 
c) Payment Protocol 
d) Deposit Protocol 
Among these four protocols, the "opening protocol" is very clumsy and it de-
grades the overall performance of this scheme. Although the opening protocol 
is claimed to be invoked less frequently, it compromises the security concern 
definitely by changing the license of the user after a longer period of time. 
Opening protocol is proceeded when a customer is opening an account. 
Firstly, Okamoto proposed to use bit commitment scheme in realizing single-
term property at this opening stage. This scheme required many repeated 
challenge-response type data transfer and computation. This awkward "CHECK 
MOD-MULT" Protocol slowed down the process seriously. 
On the other side, Binary Tree approach provide efficient capability of divid-
ing the electronic coins but still, large demanding of memory size to memorize 
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all used nodes and large data transfer sizes for each transaction hinder its advo-
cation. 
Electronic cash system efficiency can be defined as: 
Protocol Efficiency a terse protocol provides fast data transfer and short com-
putation lead-time. 
Resources Efficiency small electronic cash size requires small memory size to 
store the coins. 
In next section, an Abacus model is first set up and it is shown that how an 
Abacus structure is an optimized adaptation to our daily cash usage. Then, an 
explanation of how it can improve the opening protocol is given. This solves the 
shortcomings mentioned above and is more efficient than the previous schemes. 
The key technique is RSA digital signature and encryption algorithm. The 
security of this scheme relies on the difficulty of factoring. 
6.2 Abacus Model 
Spending Behavior For daily use, large quantity of small denomination coins 
are required for low value transactions. To optimize this kind of usage, we should 
have adequate "small coins" (coins with small denomination) for each payment. 
Concept Abacus approach stores the withdrawn cash in a way that it has 
already been broken into pieces in an appropriate extent just like "small coins" 
in your electronic wallets when the cash is withdrawn from a bank and those 
coins can be used directly for a payment without requiring further subdividing. 
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In other words, abacus approach stores a withdrawn amount in customer's wallet 
as a set of small coins which are ready to use without any extra effort to divide 
it into smaller pieces. 
An Abacus is a coin-rack with many shelves to store the coins with different 
denominations. It is analogous with an abacus, which is a frame with beads that 
slide along parallel rods, used for counting. One Abacus shelf is equivalent to 
one parallel rod. Coins in the same shelf denote the same denomination. There 
is no fixed size for each shelf but the number of coins in the shelves is managed 
in a pyramid style with more "small coins" allocated at lower shelves of the 
coin-rack and less "large coins" at higher shelves. By using this approach, many 
coins are located at lower shelves (lower values). An Abacus shelf structure can 
be defined as below: 
Abacus Shelf Structure Let the abacus has T shelves. The denomination 
with respect to minimum divisible unit (MDU) of shelves i (1 < i < T) 
is denoted as d{. MDU is the smallest denomination that we can use in this 
money system (e.g. 1 cent). Shelf 1 (the lowest shelf) contains the MDU coins 
and higher shelves contain larger denomination coins. Shelf i has an all-one bit 
string, t“ with Ci bits in length where c,+i should never larger than q . Each bit 
of ti denotes one coin with denomination di. When coins are going to be added 
onto the rack, a set of rules should be followed as below: 
Abacus Coin Allocation Rule Coins are allocated to the highest shelf first 
and then packed down to the lowest MDU shelf, shelf 1. Let the divisibility pre-
cision is N where N = (the total coin value)/(minimum divisible unit value). 
The total amount is first divided into 2 halves and padded one T bit to the 
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Shelf No. Denomination, d Bit String, t Shelf AmounT| 
6 ^ 1 W 
5 20 1 20 
4 10 1 10 
3 5 11 10 
2 2 11 4 
1 1 111111 ^ 
Table 6.1: An Abacus stores $100 worth coins. 
highest shelf, tr whose denomination dr should bejust less than [N/2\. Then, 
dr is deducted from N and the coin is further divided into halves and the half 
is compared with the denomination of the shelf immediately below the previous 
level, we denote the denomination of this level as dr_i . If the denomination is 
less than the value of the half, one，1，bit is padded to this shelf and the half 
is then deducted by the corresponding d j - i . ,1, bit is padded continually into 
this level and the half is further deducted by d j - i until it cannot be deducted. 
Table 6.1 shows an Abacus in which a total amount of $100 coins are residing. 
For simplicity, I choose $1 as the MDU in this example and thus N = 100. 
It is noticed that there are a lot of small coins that are convenient for daily low 
value transactions. For example, if a payment requires $13, the payer chooses 
one $10 coin, one $2 coin and one $1 coin for this payment. These invoke 
transmissions of t j ( l ) , ^2(l) and / i ( l ) to the payee where ^,(1) means that the 
content of bit one of that bit string, t in shelf i (1 < i < 6). This procedure 
is carried out until no combinations of the coins are available for a payment. 
As previous example, if the coins on the Abacus have almost been used up and 
only one $50 coin left and if the payer needs to pay $1 to make a phone call at 
that time, subdivision of the $50 coin is required. In the next section, a divisible 
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Abacus approach is proposed. 
6.3 Divisible Abacus Electronic Coins 
As mentioned in the last part of previous section, subdivision of large value 
coins is necessary when all small coins are used up. In this section, the tree 
approaches are presented, which can be imported to Abacus scheme to achieve 
a divisible Abacus electronic cash system. Basically, a tree approach is to divide 
a coin value into many small pieces and distribute the pieces as nodes on a 
tree structure. A tree consists of a node called the root together with multiple 
branches and ends up with many leaves. The root contains the value of the coin 
and the direct descendant nodes break down the value in some manner provided 
that the sum of these nodes is equal to the root value. In the following two 
subsections, two types of tree approaches are described and analyzed. 
6.3.1 Binary Tree Abacus Approach 
Binary Tree (BT) approach was adopted for divisible cash scheme [DC95, 
E094, 0 0 9 2 , Oka95, Pai93] before. Each coin of worth w = 2' is associated 
with a tree of (/ + 1) levels and w leaves. Each node of the tree represents a 
certain denomination. Also, each node has two sons and a unique root node 
exists at the top of the tree. In general, w needs not to be equal to 2'. This 
induces a situation that the value of a node is not divisible by 2. Then, the two 
corresponding sons would have different values whose difference is equal to 1. 
Figure 6.1 shows a BT of $5, which is divided to 5 $1 leaves. 
This tree is constructed with 4 levels by computing 1 = ([l0g2 A ]^ + 1), 
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y^ 
^ 3 fi^ 
® ® ® fe^ 
@ ® 
Figure 6.1: A Binary Tree denoting $5. 
where N is the divisibility precision. In order to prevent over-spending and to 
guarantee the total value of spent nodes would not be greater than the coin 
worth value, the following restrictions and rules must be obeyed: 
1) Value of a node, o, is the total of that of the direct sons of o. 
2) Route Node Rule: When a node is used, all descendant nodes and all 
ancestor nodes cannot be used. 
3) Same node Rule: No node can be used more than once. 
Figure 6.2 shows a BT of $50 coin. It has 7 levels and 50 leaves. The total 
number of nodes of this BT is 99. 
6.3.2 Multi-tree Approach 
Binary Tree approach is a special case of Multi-Tree approach. Alternatively, 
we can say that Multi-Tree (MT) approach is a general prolongation from BT 
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^ ^ _ _ i 5 l _ _ ^ ^ 
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ d ^ J ^ ^ 
^ i 5 l ^ ^ ^ 5 ¾ 残 魚 
¢ ^ ^ 残 ^ ¾ … 
^ ^ … x ^ … 
( ^ ^ … ^ ^ 叙 … ® ® … © 0 … 
Figure 6.2: A Binary Tree approach of a $50 coin. 
approach. Therefore, the restrictions and rules of BT also apply to MT. As 
BT, the total number of levels of a MT-n is /„ = (�log^ATI + 1)’ where n is 
the number of branches for each node and N is divisibility precision. Then, how 
many branches it should be required for best daily usage? This question induces 
the following argument: 
If more branches are available for each node, each parent node is 
subdivided to many sons. Thus, the node value on each level is 
decreased rapidly to the minimum divisible unit and the number 
of levels is decreased also. These cause the total number of nodes 
decreased. However, if there are too many branches, more tokens 
(nodes) may be needed to add up for one payment because the value 
of each token may be small. This degrades the payment protocol's 
efficiency. On the contrary, if fewer branches are available for each 
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^r:f5^^k #¾¾¾ #^¾^¾^  
0 ® ® © 0 0 ® ® 0 0 
Figure 6.3: A MT-4 approach of a $50 coin. 
node, BT is a MT-n with n = 2 as an extreme case. It shows later 
in this paper that it achieves the least average tokens required for 
one payment but the coin size is larger. 
There are altogether n'~^ nodes at ith level (i = 1,. •. ’ / ) . As the previous 
example, if the coin worth $50 and a MT-4 of this coin will have 4 levels, U = 
([l0g4 50] + 1) = 4, and 50 leaves. The total number of nodes of this M T is 71. 
Comparing with that of BT, /2 = 7 levels, BT needs 3 more levels to represent 
the same coin. Figure 6.3 shows this MT-4 approach of $50 coin. 
6.3.3 Analysis 
When considering the total number of nodes, BT has 99 nodes for N = 50 while 
MT-4 has 71 nodes. It can also be shown that when n increases, fewer nodes are 
required for each coin. The lower bound of the total number of nodes is N when 
n = N. The tree approaches such as B T and M T are both suitable to use with 
Abacus because all such tree structures can provide the maximum number of 
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minimum divisible unit (MDU) tokens (BT and MT-4 have the same number of 
leaves). For example, if a coin worth $50 and the MDU is $1, it is shown above 
that both BT and MT-n can provide 50 $1 tokens. Larger MT-n achieves this 
with fewer nodes and fewer levels to yield fewer total numbers of nodes. This 
can save the storage size of the coin. 
We noticed as above that the MT-n Abacus requires less resources in storing 
coins. It provides better resource efficiency. For protocol efficiency, the average 
number of tokens required to transmit per payment is considered. During a 
payment, the minimum number of nodes used is 1, for both BT and MT-4, that 
is when the whole coin being used once and for all. For computing the maximum 
possible number of nodes used for one payment, the maximum number of nodes 
per level used is (n — 1) where n is the number of branches for each node and 
the maximum number of levels used is (/ - 1). Thus, the maximum possible 
number of nodes used in one payment is {n — 1)(/ — 1). The average number of 
nodes used is [(n — 1)(/ — 1) + l ] /2 . For BT, the average number of nodes used 
is 4 if N = 50 while for MT-4, the number is 5. Thus, the data transfer of B T 
approach is more efficient than that of a MT-n approach for n > 2 during data 
transfer by transmitting the minimum number of tokens per payment. 
Abacus can be used in conjunction with tree structure to achieve divisible 
electronic cash system. This approach is very efficient by following the following 
rule: 
Use all available coins on the abacus table for all payments whenever 
possible. If there are not enough available coins without subdivid-
ing for a payment, BT or MT-4 is then employed to divide large 
denomination coins. 
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In the next section, I'll show how the Abacus be implemented in an electronic 
cash system. 
6.4 Abacus Electronic Cash System 
In this section, the basic protocols in the abacus electronic cash system will 
be introduced. The definition of the system is essentially based on those of 
CFN90, 0 0 9 2 , Oka95]. The electronic cash system consists of the following 
parts. 
1. Opening Account: A customer, Alice, obtains an electronic license from 
the bank, B. This part is analogous to account opening in a bank. An effi-
cient opening protocol is shown below which uses cut-and-choose method-
ology. 
2. Cash Withdraw: Alice withdraws a certain amount of electronic cash 
from her bank account. 
3. Payment: Alice uses electronic cash to pay for goods in Bob's shop. 
4. Deposit: Bob stores electronic cash to his bank account. 
6.4.1 Opening Protocol 
As in [0092] and [Oka95], the electronic cash consists of an electronic license 
and electronic coins. Alice opens a bank account and obtains the electronic 
license (N, L) where 
L = (A^ + a ) i / A ' m o d n (6 . i ) 
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in which (n, K) is the RSA [RSA78] public key of the bank, B; a is another B's 
public key for blind signature [Cha83, Cha88] and N is a Williams integer (see 
section 2.7). In this protocol, B signed the electronic license blindly to ensure N 
and L are kept secretly from B and to maintain the identity of Alice untraceable. 
Also, cut-and-choose methodology is employed to let Alice prove B that N is 
honestly generated without revealing any of her identity information on N and 
L. On the other side, L is the signed version of N such that it cannot be created 
by others but only can the bank. All others can verify it by using B's public 
key, K. 
This opening protocol is shown as below: 
Step 1. Alice prepares the Williams integers Ni from two large prime factors 
Pi, Qi for Ni = P ^ , where Pi = 3 (mod 8) and Qi = 7 (mod 8), for 
i = 1, • • -,k where k is a positive integer as B's secure parameter (e.g. 
k = 100). 
Step 2. For each pair of Pi and Qi, Alice gives B 
Ti = gPt mod $ (6.2) 
and yi = gQ' mod $ (6.3) 
as Alice's identity. B cannot reveal Pi or Qi from Xi and yi. The security 
comes from discrete logarithm problem (see section 2.10). Then Alice 
computes and sends to B 
Si = {Ni + a)rf (mod n) (6.4) 
where n. is the blinding factor chosen randomly. 
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Step 3. 
B selects a random subset of (A ; -1 ) distinct blind candidates indices U = {z.j}, 
where (1 < ij < k) for j = l , . . . , ( k - 1) and asks Alice to open the 
corresponding blind candidates. 
Step 4. Alice compiles by giving (P^, Qi) and r^  for all i in U to B. 
Step 5. B checks g^' mod $ 三 a:; and gQ' mod $ = y [ Then B computes and 
checks if PiQr = Ni and 5,-三 [Ni + a ) r f . 
Step 6. From this point, only �h a s not been revealed. If all the above checks 
are positive, B signs 5¾-^  as 
4 K = (&+«)"〜,，（m o d n ) . (6.5) 
This technique employs the multiplicative property of RSA where n = pq 
and p, q are large prime integers. 
Step 7. Alice extracts the signed license as 
L = V % ^ + a f ' K (mod n) (6.6) 
by dividing the blinding factor, r , , . For simplicity, we ignore the foot 
notation of N hereafter. 
In this protocol, k sets of (<s“ a^ ., y,) and (k - 1) sets of (尸,，Q” r,) are 
submitted to B. 
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6.4.2 Withdrawal Protocol 
After Alice opens an account at the bank, B, she can withdraw electronic cash 
from B and stores in her electronic wallet. The principle of the withdrawal 
protocol can be defined as the idea below: 
Idea Alice withdraws a certain amount of money from bank, B. The money 
consists of a set of coins with different denominations that are allocated in 
accordance with Abacus coin allocation rule. The smallest denomination 
of a coin is the MDU (e.g. 1 cent). During payment, the best combination 
of the coins is to choose with reference to the guideline stated in section 6.3.3. 
When "small coins" are not enough, refill is required. Refill is conducted by 
subdividing larger value coin into many small pieces (tokens) such that each 
subdivided piece is worth any desired value less than the original coin and the 
total value of all tokens is equivalent to the original coin value. BT or MT-n 
approaches can be employed. 
The withdrawal protocol is shown as below: 
S tep 1. Alice constructs an Abacus rack or table,三 according to A b a c u s co in 
a l l o cat i on rule stated in section 6.2 for an amount of $u;.三 has T shelves 
and the denomination with respect to MDU of shelf i (1 < i < T) is di. 
Each shelf has an all-one bit string, ti, with c,- bits in length where c,+i 
should never be larger than Ci. For each bit, a corresponding random value 
bij is chosen, where j = 1 , . . •, c,. A total of 少 coins are requested to issue 
where 
T 
^ =E^^ (6.7) 
i=l 
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T 
and w = ^ c^di. (6.8) 
i=i 
Step 2. Alice sends 三 and / ¾ to B for 
/ ¾ = r^]H(NHbij) mod n,. (6.9) 
where rij G Z„ . is a random integer, H is a one-way hash function, (e‘，Ui) 
is B's RSA public key, which corresponds to the abacus shelf denomination, 
di. The total number of / ¾ prepared by Alice is ¢ . 
Step 3. B gives D]|^' mod n,- to Alice and charges Alice's account $w;. 
Step 4. Alice extracts the coins 
C “ = W | | 6 , , ) ) ^ / ^ - m o d n,. (6.10) 
Alice can withdraw any amount of money, $w;, she likes. The abacus rack 
splits this amount to some coins with well-defined denominations. Cut-and-
choose protocol is not used here and B only need to send back 少 blindly signed 
coins to Alice. 
6.4.3 Payment and Deposit Protocol 
There are two conditions during a payment: 
1. Direct Pickup: The coins are available right on the abacus rack. No 
subdivision of the coins is required. 
2. Break Down: When there is no available coin on the abacus rack, sub-
division of the large coin is required. 
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These two conditions can be happened in a single payment as well. In con-
dition 1, it is equivalent to the spending of root node of a coin in tree structure 
approach. While in condition 2, it is equivalent to the spending of nodes of a 
coin. Therefore, these conditions can be concluded as standard tree structure 
approach. For each coin no matter what condition it is, two stages are car-
ried out, those are coin authentication and denomination revelation. The 
followings show the two procedures. Please note that the notations have been 
altered from [Oka95] slightly to cope with multiple coins. 
Coin Authentication 
1) Alice sends her identity (N, L) and coins (Qj, bij) where i e { 1 , . . . , T } and 
j G { 1 , . •. ’ Ci} to the merchant, Bob. 
2) Bob checks that L^ = N + a (mod n) and C-； = H(N\\b,j) (mod n,). 
Denomination Revelation Let / r , h and / ^ are three randomized hash 
functions. Alice memorizes all the nodes already spent for each coin. Since 
direct pickup of a coin is equivalent to spending the root node of the coin, it is 
adequate to describe the procedure of node payment below. 
Let Alice selects a node rij^...j^ (jk G {0, {q - 1) } , k = 1 ， . . � t and q is the 
number of branches of a multi-tree structured electronic coin, which has a total 
of 1 levels). When Alice spends this node, the following payment protocol will 
be carried out. 
Step 1. Alice computes 
[(〈(〜1 - 1广1"'伸 , 1 1 _ 2广2力_1...(〜)2〜 
f r { C \ m N ) ) Q n y / ' ' mod N U (6.11) 
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where 
^ n - j , = � / i a ( q U i | h . l U i | | W ) � i f o r i = l ^ . , ; ^ - l . (6.12) 
Step 2. Bob computes flj^...j, when j;+i = 1 (i = 1 , . . . , t - 1) and verifies that 
{^n.. . jJN) = - 1 and 
(rVJ2'三卿化各1广1)'(〜1一2广2力-、..(〜严X 
/r(C||0||yV) (mod N) (6.13) 
where d G {士1’土2}. 
Step 3. If all correct, Bob chooses a random value e' G {0 ,1 }^ , and sends his 
identity ID, time 5, and e' to Alice, where u = 0 ( m ) , m = \P\. Bob 
computes e = h{ID\\5\\e') where e G { 0 , 1 } " and h is a randomized hash 
function. This is to prevent the bank, B from crediting an invalid shop's 
account. 
Step 4. Alice computes e accordingly and then computes 八力…)、such that 
(Aji...jj2"+i 三 ^^'{h(C\\ji\\-'-\\jt\\N))Qfi (mod N) (6.14) 
Step 5. Bob verifies that 
(A_n...jt)2"+i = "'227A(C||jiH...||jd|AT) (mod N) (6.15) 
w h e r e c f e { ± l , ± 2 } . 
When Bob deposits these coins and tokens to his bank account, he simply 
forwards all the history o f the transaction that conducted with Alice to the bank. 
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6.5 Anonymity and System Efficiency 
This protocol guarantees customer's anonymity. The customer is protected by 
blind signature during money withdrawal. The bank cannot trace the withdrawn 
money notes since the customer's identity P and Q are concealed. This security 
is equivalent to d i screte log p r o b l e m (see section 2.10). At the same time, the 
bank can be ensured that the customer generates his identity honestly by using 
cut-and-choose methodology (see section 2.13). The secure parameter, k, 
is large enough (e.g. k = 100) that the odds of having a ruse to pass the bank 
are 1 in k. During payment, the honest customer only uses the money note 
ONCE, the merchant and the bank even collusion between them cannot reveal 
the customer's identity. On the other side, if the customer double spending or 
over spending the electronic cash, there is method for the bank to reveal his 
identity efficiently. It is even much easier than checking the fingerprints on a 
real money note. However, linkability between the payments exists which let the 
bank or third party is able to trace the spending route of the electronic coins. 
In the system efficiency issue, Abacus electronic cash scheme acquires the 
properties of Abacus model and tree structures. As an example, if Alice make a 
series of payments to various kinds of shops in a sequence like this: $5, $7, $23, 
$12, $1, $40, $7 and $5. She withdraws $100 worth coins from the bank. Let the 
MDU is $1 for simplicity. We can treat those payments as a sample sequence 
such as {5,7,23,12,1,40,7,5}. By using BT approach, 15 tokens are required to 
transmit for these 8 payments. If Abacus MT-4 is used, 12 coins (direct pickup) 
and 9 tokens (break down) or 7 tokens, if maximized, are required to transmit. 
If Abacus BT is used, 12 coins (direct pickup) and 7 tokens (break down) or 
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6 tokens, if maximized, are required to transmit. Since the number of coins 
breaking down is decreased for Abacus approach, less computation is required 




In this report, two new fundamental concepts are proposed which give new 
directions on the development of untraceable divisible off-line electronic cash. 
Unit-of-time spending limit enforced electronic cash is the first concept and 
the interest-bearing electronic cash is the second break-through concept. In 
addition, these two concepts are also realized with two compatible schemes. 
Direct construction technique and secret-sharing line approach are elaborated 
in details. Further work can also be done be employing these two concepts 
to tree structured electronic cash approach. It is also shown that these new 
concepts can bring out many practical applications and still more are going to 
be emerged. 
On the other side, the Abacus type divisible cash structure has been in-
troduced. Implementation of an Abacus type divisible untraceable brokerless 
electronic cash scheme and improvements on opening protocol have been demon-
strated. It is shown that the Abacus type electronic cash system is more efficient 
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than the previous proposed systems. Abacus approach splits the money to vari-
ous smaller coins, which is good for daily use especially for the small transactions. 
Furthermore, Abacus is very flexible to use with tree structures (both Binary 
Tree and Multi-tree structures) to achieve divisibility and to further compress 
the coin size. On the system efficiency aspect, the crux of the Abacus elec-
tronic cash system is the improvement on both protocol efficiency and resources 
efficiency. By considering the protocol efficiency, Abacus type electronic cash 
scheme gives an efficient opening protocol, which is practical for daily low trans-
action applications. For Abacus approach used with Binary Tree, fewer tokens 
in average are required to transfer for each payment than those used in Multi-
Tree. It is good for application whose data transfer protocol is carried on narrow 
bandwidth link (e.g. smart card application). When considering the resource 
efficiency, Abacus table structure in conjunction with Multi-Tree approach pro-
vides the smallest coin size among the alternatives presented and also optimizes 
each payment activities by minimizing the computational requirement. 
Finally, we turn our vision to look into the relationship between electronic 
cash and physical cash. It's already realized to be awkward to pay for the 
services or goods provided on computer networks by checks or paper bills. People 
are already giving up the use of physical cash on the Internet and also in the 
meantime, they are getting acquainted in using various kind of electronic means 
such as electronic purse cards, prepaid phone cards and even electronic cash. 
With the further improvements of technologies and boosting up of population 
on ordering goods and services through the global communications networks 
with the diversifying needs, it is not only fantastic but practical of this new 
cyber society being make the physical cash obsolete soon. 
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Internet Payment Systems 
Figure A.1 shows the 4 kinds of Internet payment systems that are going to be 
covered in this annex. 
A.1 Bare Web FORM 
By using only F O R M tag of Hypertext Markup Language (HTML)i and simple 
Common Gateway Interface ( C G I f scripts, we can create our first online cyber-
shop cashing counter^. Figure A.2 shows the system's working principle: 
Step 1. A buyer downloads the HTML file containing payment form from the 
shop's homepage (Form.html). This HTML file contains a pair of FORM 
tag which has a hypertext link referring to the address of a CGI program. 
Step 2. The buyer then fills in his card number, expiration date and other 
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Figure A.1: Various Internet Payment Systems 
required information and press a "send" button to send back the form. 
Step 3. The buyer's information will then be routed to the address of the CGI 
program. 
Step 4. The CGI program parses the buyer's card information, checks for valid-
ity and informs other components of the cyber-shop to dispatch something 
that the buyer requested to buy. 
Usually the CGI program would not perform online card authentication for 
cost consideration. Card authentication is performed in batch mode. For exam-
ple, it is carried out once per day. Thus, this payment system is usually used 
by merchants dealing with goods which require shipping to their customers. 
On the other side, card information is transmitted through Internet inse-
curely by using HTML's FORM tag which in turn is riding over Hypertext 
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Figure A.2: Interactions between HTML FORM and CGI Program 
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Transfer Protocol ( H T T P ” . Cyber eavesdroppers can get your card information 
easily from the bare HTTP messages. One criminal scenario can be described 
as an intruder who is either a router's administrator or be able to crack into 
the router such that he can access all the raw data flowing through this router. 
If this router is the only gateway for a merchant's web server to connect to 
the outside world, all buyer's card information has to travel through this router 
before reaching the merchant's server. The intruder can therefore easily obtain 
all buyers' card information easily by parsing the HTTP messages. This is a 
generic attack called man in the middle. 
A.2 Secure Web FORM Payment System 
This payment system is an extension of the previous one. It is similar to the 
bare Web FORM approach, but there is a secure channel being enforced for 
carrying data transmitted between the merchant and the buyer. Commonly, it 
is a set of protocols residing on top of transport layer. Data to be transmitted is 
first encrypted at this security reinforced layer before passing down to transport 
layer and then to other lower layers. This kind of payment system is now used 
widely on the Internet. 
One of the most popular protocols to provide the secure channel is called 
Secure Sockets Layer (SSLf which is first proposed by Netscape Communi-
cations Corporation. By now, SSL is supported by almost all Graphical User 
Interface (GUI) based World Wide Web ( W W W ) browsers including Netscape 
Navigator and Communicator, Microsoft Internet Explorer and America Online 
4www.w3 .org/Protocols 
5www.netscape.com / eng/security 
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Web Browser. 
Besides solely supporting HTTP, SSL is also extending itself to many other 
aspects. For example, it allows client/server (e.g. telnet and ftp)® applications 
to communicate in a way that prevents eavesdropping, tampering or message 
forgery. 
A.3 Membership Type Payment System 
The above two payment systems require buyer's credit card information to trans-
mit over Internet directly. From this system onward, I describe two other types 
of payment systems which require no card information wandering on Internet. 
Membership type payment system^ requires each buyer to supply his 
card information via phone or postal services to merchant in advance. The 
merchant will then issue userid and password to the buyer. This initial 
step is called Phase of Registration. During purchasing, the buyer sends his 
userid and password to the merchant, which are encrypted for transmission by 
a proprietary system. 
Although the card number is never transmitted over Internet, buyer's conve-
nience is compromised with an additional phase of registration. Also, each pair 
of userid and password is only good for one merchant and is persistent. For an 
online shopping mall with a huge number of shops, this system will become too 
clumsy to be applied. 
6www.cryptsoft.com 
7www. netmarket .com 
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A.4 Agent Based Payment System 
To tackle the last problem in previous system, the agent based payment system 
makes a little modifications from the previous one. 
During the phase of registration, buyer gives his card information via phone 
to an agent instead of individual shop. The agent sends back a userid via 
Email. To buy things, buyer sends his userid to the shop who accepts the 
agent's userid. The userid is sent unencrypted through bare Web FORM. After 
the shop receives the userid, it passes the userid to the agent with the buyer's 
ordering details. The agent will then sends the buyer an email to confirm the 
purchase. 
Userid is on longer stuck on a single merchant and every purchase is further 
confirmed by the buyer via email. That is also why the userid is not required to 
keep secret during transmission. Another extra feature is that each buyer has 
to have an email account. More information can be obtained online from First 
Virtual Holdings Incorporated's homepage®. 
A.5 Internet-based POS 
This system is more or less similar to our conventional Point-of-Sale (POS) sys-
tem in the shops. It provides online credit card authentication. Great advantage 
is noticed on instantly providing goods or services requested by the buyer such 
as downloading softwares or documents. This system requires each buyer to 
install proprietary software on his machine and each merchant has to install an 
8www.fv.com 
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Internet-based POS system to communicate with an online credit card authen-
tication server. The buyer's software is responsible for sending the buyer's card 
information to the online POS securely. Details of the system can be obtained 
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